

1968/9
YEAR
STAMP

Contents checked
for transfer to
D.R.O.
(Sgt. *P. O'Brien*)
Date *10/11/70*

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH
OFFICE

DEPT.

NEAR EASTERN

U K EYES ONLY. (1-43)

FILE No. **NE** *Q 10/3* (Part)

TITLE: *Sale of Red Top and other
Missiles to Iraq.*

*W
18*

REFER TO

REFER TO

REFER TO

NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE
<i>DT & SD</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>28/11</i>	<i>Reg.</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>10/3</i>	<i>PH</i>	<i>43</i>	<i>1/1</i>
<i>REMY</i>		<i>5/12</i>	<i>P. H.</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>10/3</i>	<i>Reg.</i>		
<i>DJM</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>6/12</i>	<i>Reg.</i>		<i>11/3</i>			
<i>M. Murray DTSD</i>		<i>10/12</i>	<i>Mr. Trippe</i>	<i>29</i>	<i>14/3</i>			
<i>TYPE</i>		<i>12/12</i>	<i>P. H.</i>		<i>14/3</i>			
<i>Mr. Murray DTSD</i>		<i>13/12</i>	<i>Reg.</i>		<i>18/3</i>			
<i>Reg.</i>		<i>21/1</i>	<i>P. H.</i>		<i>19/3</i>			
<i>S. G. M.</i>		<i>21/1</i>	<i>Reg.</i>		<i>20/2</i>			
<i>Reg.</i>		<i>27/1</i>	<i>DTSD (Mr. Davidson)</i>					
<i>S. G. M.</i>		<i>27/1</i>	<i>NET</i>		<i>21/4</i>			
<i>DTSD</i>		<i>4/2</i>	<i>P. B.</i>		<i>25/4</i>			
<i>P. H.</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>12/2</i>	<i>Reg.</i>		<i>25/4</i>			
<i>PH</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>14/2</i>	<i>Mr. Trippe</i>	<i>37-38</i>				
<i>Reg.</i>			<i>Reg. PMH</i>		<i>30/4</i>			
<i>DTSD</i>			<i>P. H.</i>		<i>20/5</i>			
<i>Reg.</i>		<i>18/2</i>	<i>Reg.</i>		<i>24/5</i>			
<i>PRMH.</i>		<i>24/2</i>	<i>P. H.</i>		<i>2/6</i>			
<i>OTSD</i>	<i>(20)</i>	<i>28/2</i>	<i>Reg.</i>		<i>17/6</i>			
<i>MR MURRAY.</i>		<i>10/3</i>	<i>DTSD</i>		<i>19/7</i>			
					<i>24/7</i>			

Registry Address

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Downing Street

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PART

NE 610/3

FILE No.

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(5976)

CONFIDENTIAL **E.I.R. 201**



ME/191/04

22nd. October, 1968

Dear Mr. Brown,

IRAQ - VIGILANT

E.D.S. has received an enquiry from a Mr. Moraley of Beirut seeking quotations for the supply of various items of defence equipment to Iraq.

The question of the propriety of dealing through agents is being considered as a separate issue but meantime can you please say whether you would be prepared to agree to the supply of Vigilant anti-tank g.w. to Iraq.

This letter is being copied to Mr. Murray of the Foreign Office for his views and to all other members of the A.W.P. for information.

Yours sincerely,

F. E. YATES

(F.E. Yates)

**Mr. R.W. Brown,
Army Sales,
M.O.D.,
St. Christopher House,
Southwark Street,
London S.E.1.**

Mr. C. G. Warman
D.S.13

M.O.D., Main Building, Whitehall

Mrs. J. M. Shephard
D.S.13

Miss L. B. Craner
Navy Sales Division,
Old Admiralty, Whitehall

Mr. D. J. S. Murray
Defence Supply Section,
Foreign Office, Whitehall

Mr. D. Church
Board of Trade,
Victoria Street, S.W.1.

Miss J. E. Stevens
Board of Trade,
Hillgate House,
35 Old Bailey, E.C.4.

Mr. S. P. Bourne
Department of Economic Affairs,
Storey's Gate, S.W.1.

Mr. J. A. Patterson
Treasury,
Whitehall, S.W.1.

Mr. R. W. Browne
Sales 5(a),
Army Dept.,
St. Christopher House, S.E.1.

E.I.R.2(c) - Mr. J. Coates

E.I.R.1(c) - Mr. L. Savigar

Mr. Mabinson New Bunter Dept.

Please see Mr. Yates's letter about an enquiry regarding the possibility of selling Vigilant to Iraq.

2. Vigilant is a first generation wire-guided anti-tank weapon launched and controlled by one man. It is in U.K. service at present.

3. Arabia Department are currently dealing with a British request to permit a B.A.C. salesman to tour the Gulf states selling this weapon. First reaction from the Gulf has been hostile, but the salesman intends also to visit Kuwait and Beirut (where he will, no doubt, be contacted by Mr. Hussey!).

4. Vigilant might be described as primarily defensive, but this does not preclude its use in operations which are essentially offensive in nature e.g. the ^{defence} ~~seizure~~ of a firm base, possession of which will provide a pivot on which tanks can operate offensively. It therefore would have relevance in operations against Kuwait.

25 Oct 68

J. P. J. P. Munn
Tel B1496

to Murray: D.T.S.T.

This seems to "add a new dimension" to Iraqi eqpt, in that it provides a guided A/T weapon. If I am right in this assumption I think we shd object.

NA

NED.: 30. 10. 68

Vigilant is indeed a guided weapon, but not in the more sophisticated sense of the term. The missile is small and is rocket-propelled; as it flies it emits a line of cable through which the fire controller guides it by means of an electrical system of ^{signals} ~~signals~~ which he operates manually. The weapon, being in service, is obsolescent already and the French produce a similar weapon ^{which they} and would no doubt be eager to sell to the Iraqis.

2. Vigilant is not all that easy to operate, and I doubt whether many Iraqi soldiers have the type of nerve needed to control the missile in flight in a war situation. I would myself say that the acquisition of Vigilant would

bring the Iraqis out of the anti-tank gun ^{area} but not
to the field of advanced mobility.

4 Mar 68

J. J. Murray
J.T.S.D.

MS24/D.S.(E): Tale B1408

M. J. Murray J.S.D.

I understand the point
about "guided ~~missile~~ weapon".
But it is better than an A/T gun.
Perhaps we should seek mod
views in the Iraq/Kuwait
context.

John B.

I am afraid that I failed to comment on
letter minute - wire. Draft to Mr. Yates for
clearance, please. I have included your point about
mod views.

7 Mar 68

J. J. Murray
J.T.S.D.

MS24/D.S.(E): Tale B1408

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L.H. 4DT

**MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY****E.I.R.2B2,**
 Castlewood House, 77-91 New Oxford Street
 LONDON W.C.1

Telex: 22241 Telegrams: Mintec London Telex

Telephone: 01-636 3644, ext.

Our reference: HU/151/07

Your reference: DSQM.21

HU/151/011

17 October, 1968.

Dear Mr. Murray,

Iraq - Tigercat and Blowpipe

At a recent meeting with Major General E.M. Hall Military Deputy to the Head of Defence Sales, Short Bros. and Harland's sales representative was given the impression that the political climate in Iraq was now such that permission to supply Tigercat could well be granted in the near future.

During Farnborough Air Showweek we sought permission, by telephone, for the firm to talk to the Iraqis about Tigercat and Blowpipe. Permission was given for both systems at Column 2. restricted level only - we advised the firm that there must be no commitment to supply.

Shorts remain convinced that there is a market in Iraq for Tigercat and eventually Blowpipe; they have now written asking for confirmation that in the event that the Iraqis are interested, approval to supply would be forthcoming. May we have your advice please.

I am copying this letter to Mr. Alldis (MOD (Navy Sales)), Mr. R.W. Browne (MOD (Army Sales)) and Mr. Warman (DS13 MOD).

Yours sincerely,

 Mr. D. Murray,
 Defence Supply Section,
 Foreign Office,
 London, S.W.1.

(Dgd) V. Smith

 See photo ①
 by whom?

 Mr. Murray
 Reg.
 minute
 18/10
 19/10

2


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CONFIDENTIAL

Enter please

(3)

57/0'Seas/1106
HU/151/014

25 October 1968



Dear Mr. Yates,

IRAQ - VIGILANT

Referring to your letter of 22nd October, enclosing a copy of your letter to Mr. Browne of Army Sales on the subject of the sale of Vigilant ATCW System to Iraq, I have to inform you that on operational grounds the Army Department cannot agree to this proposal.

As we object to supply there is little point in releasing information at this stage, especially to an agent based in the Lebanon.

I am copying this letter to Mr. Browne and Mr. Murray.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgt) C. J. C. SHERMAN RO II

(C.J.C. Sherman)

F.E. Yates Esq
Ministry of Technology
RIR 2b1
Castlewood House
77-91 New Oxford St
London, W.C.1

Copies for: D.J.S. Murray Esq, Foreign and Commonwealth Office ✓
R.W. Browne Esq, Sales 5(A), MOD(Army)

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NEP.10/3

Reference.....

f. 2

DTSD

Mr Murray ✓

See 9

I understand you have
not yet seen f. 2.

It is all overtaken
by f1, but it illustrates
the error of using passive
verbs in the wrong place

I should very much
like to know who is
giving S & H political
advice.

J. Maclean
19.11.68

There seems to have been an
alteration to numbers. f1 is
now f4.

DM
6/10

now
f.4

With the Compliments of

E. R. 2 152

MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY



15th November 1968

ADMIN. FORM 142

**RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 15**

19 NOV 1968

NEQ 10/3

Mr. Mahan, New Eastern Dept.

Iraq - Vigilant

Please see the attached letter from Brig.
Sherman of Army Department about the sale of
Vigilant to Iraq. You will see that the Army
Department would object to sale, and therefore do
not agree to release information.

31 Oct 68

J. J. Murray

NS24/D.S.; Tele: MB 1488

h. Murray BDD

Pl

See separate minute

J. J.
6/11

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From: K.W. Nutting, Sales 5b(A)



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

St. Christopher House, Southwark Street,

LONDON S.E.1

Telephone: 01-928 7999, Exr 4237

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 56 1 NOV 1968 NER 10/3 29 October 1968

Our Ref: A/10/Clearances/2316

Your Ref: HU/151/07 HU/151/011

lee (2) ARABIAN
Anderson
Out to see

29
D.S. in Murray
in Hodge
in Murray

Please refer to your letter of 17th October 1968 to Murray in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office about the supply of Tigercat and Blowpipe to Iraq.

We have consulted the General Staff about this and they consider that the supply of these weapons would increase the operational capabilities of the Iraq forces and place the Kuwaiti forces at an increased disadvantage. We cannot therefore agree to the supply of these weapons. *will not*

There are also security reservations on the supply of classified equipment to Iraq. In the case of Blowpipe it is, and will continue to be, on the classified list. We would wish to restrict the supply of classified equipment until it had been in British Service hands for at least eighteen months and therefore, even if there were no operational objections to supply, we could not agree to the supply of Blowpipe to Iraq until mid 1973 at the earliest as we believe the best British In-service date to be late 1971.

Yours sincerely,

K. W. NUTTING

Mrs V. Smith
Ministry of Technology
EIR 2B2

Copies for information to:

G.G. Warman Esq
C.A. Aldis Esq
D.J.S. Murray
L.A. Savigar
D.E. Church Esq
Miss J.E. Stevens
R.E. Adams Esq
J. Doyle

Ministry of Defence, DS 13(b)
Ministry of Defence, Sales 1(N)
Foreign Office, T & DSD
Ministry of Technology, EIR 1
Board of Trade, (Gen Div)
Board of Trade, (ELB)
H.M. Treasury
Department of Economic Affairs

K.W. NUTTING

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CONFIDENTIAL

12 November, 1968

13/4

4/11

Iraq - Vigilant

Thank you for your letter HU/151/014 of 22 October 1968 about the supply of the Vigilant wire-guided anti-tank missile to Iraq; and also to Brigadier Sherman's letter 57/ O'Sean/1106 of 25 October, 1968, on the same subject.

As the Army Department has objected on operational grounds to the sale of this weapon to Iraq, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office would not wish to challenge this decision. But for future reference we would be grateful for an indication of the factors which led the Army Department to this conclusion, as these would appear to be relevant to consideration of any similar questions which may arise in the future and which involve similar technical advantages to those of the ATGW over the anti-tank gun.

I am copying this letter to members of the Arms Working Party as well as to Mr. Browne and Brigadier Sherman.

(D.J.S. Murray)

Defence Training and Supply Department.

P. E. Yates, Esq.,
RIR 251,
Ministry of Technology,
Castlewood House,
77-91 New Oxford Street,
London, W.C.1.

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Registry
No.

DRAFT Letter

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.

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Confidential.

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Unclassified.

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In Confidence

To:—

F.E. Yates

EIR 261

Min Tech

From

J. T. S. Murray

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

IRAQ - VIGILANT

Thank you for your letter HU/151/1014 of 22 October 1968 about the supply of the Vigilant mine. You are quite right mine is long; and also to Brigadier Sherman's letter 57/O'Sean/1106 of 25 October 1968 on the same subject.

As the Army Department has objected on operational grounds to the sale of this weapon to Iraq, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office would not wish to challenge this decision. But for future reference we would be grateful for an indication of the factors which led the Army Department to this conclusion, as there would appear to be relevant to consideration of any similar question which may arise in the future and which involve ~~no technical~~ similar technical considerations to those of the ATGV over the anti-tank gun.

I am copying this letter to members of the Arms Policy Party as well as to Mr. Brown & Brigadier Sherman.

[Signature]

Mr. McMahon, 8/11
New Easter Dept.
First.

R.W. Brown EIR
Saler 5(A)
M.O.)

A.V.P. Member

Brig C.T.C. Sherman
GS(OR)1C
M.O.)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Main Building, Whitehall, LONDON S.W.1
Telephone: WHITEhall 7022, ext.

6 5

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 56 20 NOV 1968 NEQ 10/4

Our reference:
r reference:

57/0'Seas/1106

Mintech HU/151/014

CONFIDENTIAL

15 November 1968

Dear Mr. Murray,

IRAQ - VIGILANT

I refer to your letter to Mr. Yates of 12th November 1968 in reply to his of 22nd October 1968 in which you ask for an indication of the factors which led the Army Department to object on operational grounds to the sale of Vigilant to Iraq.

2. Vigilant is an anti-tank Guided Weapon system at present in service with the British Army and if sold to the Iraqis would give them an improved anti-tank capability. This is considered inadvisable as the Kuwaiti armoured elements are not yet strong enough to face such a capability.

3. This factor is quite irrelevant when considering possible sales of other equipment to Iraq when their potential use in assisting local dissidents to create unrest in countries in that area with whom we have treaty obligations (e.g. Abu Dhabi, Trucial Oman etc) has to be considered.

4. I am copying this letter to Mr. Yates and Mr. Browne

yours sincerely

(C. J. C. SHERMAN)

D. J. S. Murray Esq
Defence Training and Supply Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
LONDON, S.W.1

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Ext. 860

Our reference: HU/151/010
Your reference:

MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

EIR. 2b2,
Room 530.

Castlewood House,
77-91 New Oxford Street,
LONDON, W.C.1.

14¹² November 1968

Dear

Discussions have been taking place between BAC, HSD and the Iraqi Air Force on the possible sale of Lightning aircraft equipped with Red Top air to air missiles. The total value of the order would be £70M and the Red Top content would amount to approximately £4M. Release of Column 3 Confidential information was agreed (C - Form GW(C) 46/S179).

It is understood that BAC have quoted to the Iraqis for Lightning aircraft and 20 Red Top packs involving 100 plus missiles.

I would therefore be grateful for the agreement of Air Force Department to the supply of Red Top to Iraq. I am copying this letter to Mr. C. A. Alldis MOD(N) and Mr. D. Murray DSS(FCO) for their agreement and to other members of the AWP for information. An early reply would be appreciated.

Yours sincerely,

(MISS J. PIKE)

Mr. J. T. Cliffe,
DS.8,
Ministry of Defence (Air Force Department)
Room 523B,
Main Building,
Whitehall, S.W.1.

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→ Mr. Murray.

copy to
highlight file near top

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ARCHIVES No. 15
21 Nov. 1980
NEQ 10/3

(1) Reg minute
(2) ~~Don~~ Ever. has seen
(3) The ~~Post-~~
Nac ~~gar~~ b.

Grateful
for early
visit on 21st
Nov 1960. W.

Mr. M. H. Tallboys,
Ministry of Defence,
Head of DS.13,
Main Building,

Mr. O. J. Porter,
MOD(Central Staffs),
DS.13(c),
Main Building,

Mr. R. W. Browne,
Ministry of Defence Army Department,
Sales 5,
St. Christopher House,
S.E.1.

Mr. R. E. Adams,
Treasury,
S.W.1.

Mr. J. Doyle,
Department of Economic Affairs,
Overseas and General Division,
73/A Ground,
Stoneys Gate,
S.W.1.

Mr. J. Coates,
EIR.2c,

Mr. L. Savigar
EIR.1(c)

Mr. D. Church,
Board of Trade,
1-19 Victoria Street,
S.W.1.

Miss J. E. Stevens,
Board of Trade,
Hillgate House,
35 Old Bailey,
E.C.4.

Secretariat
Mr. G. Warman,
DS.13(c),
Main Building.

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8

GC



Handwritten notes:
D: Division
17.02.68
10.10.68
10.10.68
10.10.68
10.10.68

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
St. Christopher House, Southwark Street,
LONDON S.E.1

Telephone: 01-928 7999, Ext 4237

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 56 22 NOV 1968 NEQ 10/3

Ref: A/10/Clearances/1599

*Copy to
NEQ 6/1*

12 November 1968

Handwritten signature and date:
2/12

Please refer to your letter HU/151/04 of 22nd October about the supply of Vigilant to Iraq.

The General Staff consider that the Kuwaiti armoured elements are not yet sufficiently strong to face an improved Iraqi anti-tank capability. They therefore object on operational grounds to the supply of Vigilant to Iraq.

Yours sincerely,

K. W. NUTTING

F. E. Yates Esq
Ministry of Technology EIR2b1

Copies for information to:

C. G. Warman Esq
C.A. Alldis Esq
D.J.S. Murray Esq
L. A. Savigar Esq
D. E. Church Esq
Miss J. E. Stevens
R. E. Adams Esq
J. Doyle Esq

Ministry of Defence, DS13(b)
Ministry of Defence, Sales 1(N)
Foreign Office, D.T.S.D. —
Ministry of Technology, EIR 1
Board of Trade, (XP)
Board of Trade, (ELB)
H. M. Treasury
Department of Economic Affairs

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CONFIDENTIAL

9

MBQ.10/3

21 November, 1968

2
Iraq: Supply of Blowpipe
and Tigercat

[Signature]
2/X/11

I am writing in reply to your letter of 17 October to Murray to say that unless we hear further we will take it that the Ministry of Defence vote, on British military grounds, on the supply of Tigercat and Blowpipe to Iraq closes the matter.

of 29 Oct at f.4

25/10.

(J. A. Davidson)
DEFENCE TRAINING & SUPPLIES DEPT.

Mrs. V. Smith,
Ministry of Technology,
E.I.R. 202,
LONDON, W.C.1.

Copies to: G. G. Warran, Esq., M.O.D. DS 15(b)
G.A. Allais, Esq., M.O.D. Sales 1(N)
L. A. Savignar, Minter, KIR 1
D. E. Church, B.O.F. (Gen. Div)
Miss J. E. Stevens B.O.F. (KLB)
R. E. Adams, Esq., Treasury
J. Doyle, Dept. of Economic Affairs
K. W. Nutting, Esq., MOD, Sales 50(A)

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Registry
No.

N32.1213

DRAFT

LETTER

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

To:—

Mrs. V. Smith,
Ministry of Technology,
E.I.R. 2B2,
Castlewood House,
LONDON, W.C.1.

From

J. A. Davidson
Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

DTSD

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

Iraq - Supply of Blowpipe and TigerCat

unless we have further

I am writing to say that we ~~are~~ taking it

that the Ministry of Defence veto, on British
military grounds, on the supply of TigerCat and
Blowpipe to Iraq closes the matter ~~for the time~~
~~being.~~

Copies to:

G. G. Warman,
Min. of Defence,
DS 13(b).

C. A. Alldis, Esq.,
M.O.D. Sales 1(N)

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

L.A. Savigar,
Min. of Tech.,
EIR 1

D.E. Church, Esq.,
B.of.T., (Gen Div)

Miss J.E. Stevens,
B.of.T. (ELB),

R.E. Adams, Esq.,
H.M. Treasury

J. Doyle,
Dept. of Economic
Affairs.

K. W. Nutting,
M.O.D., Sales 5b(A)

is only to
you 10th
07/10 October
to Murray

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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Mr. Evans
 Mr. Moore
 D.T.S.D. (Mr. Davidson)

RECEIVED IN
 ARCHIVES No.15

2 DEC 1968

NEQ 10/3

"Red Top" air-to-air missiles for Iraq

The Lightning was designed to RAF specification for air interception by equipping it with Red Top air-to-air missiles. It is, in brief, a manned flying launching pad. At a cost of £1.1 million it is an uneconomic means of doing anything else.

EA 10/3 (100)

[Flag A]

2. The inclusion of Red Top in a package sale of Lightnings was explicitly stated in earlier papers; especially in a note by the Ministry of Technology ESC(0)(68)3 of 4 March, 1968, to the Cabinet Committee on Strategic Exports, and in a subsequent MOD draft paper for Ministers of 26 March.

[Flag B]

EA 10/3 (100)

3. The only other missile that could be fitted is the outdated Firestreak. These are not in production, and in any case the Iraqis would probably not accept them.

Flag C

(7)

4. A separate department of the Ministry of Technology (EIR 2(6)) has now asked for our agreement to the supply of Red Top. Implicit in this request is the assumption that without Red Top there will be no sale. This request is to some extent premature, because -

(a) we don't know the Iraqis will choose Lightning (plus Red Top); and

(b) we don't know whether Ministers will agree to the sale of Lightnings.

But since to try and sell Lightnings without Red Top is both anomalous and likely to be unsuccessful, and since any odium we might incur will in any case be over the sale of an armed, not an unarmed aircraft, I suggest we reply that we are ready to consider the matter should there be a firm offer to buy Lightnings, but that this must depend on the ruling of Ministers on the sale as a whole.

5. If you agree I will draft accordingly.

D.J. Makinson

(D.J. Makinson)
 22 November, 1968.

Flag D

I have just seen minutes of

CONFIDENTIAL

8th & 10th October on
Security Dept file DS. PM 247
about the release of information
on this missile, when we
apparently agreed. It will thus
~~not be easy~~ be difficult not to agree to the
sale, since the information
was released with a view to sale.

Mr. Moore.

J. Makinson

My recommendation is that
we should tell the Ministry of
Technology that we cannot at the
moment commit ourselves. In
doing so, we could draw their
attention to our position in
respect of the lightnings
themselves (that our decision
over the grant of an export
licence would depend on the
circumstances prevailing at the
time the licence was applied
for) and point out that it
would be anomalous for
H.M.G. to agree to sell Red Top
before any decision had been
taken over the aircraft which
would carry it.

2. Although I agree with Mr.
Makinson that our agreement to
release classified information
about Red Top was given to
help B.A.C.'s sales effort, I do
not think this need - or should
- commit us in favour of
granting an export licence / it

it and when a license is asked for by the company.
 3. On a point of procedure, I think that the reply to Miss Pike's letter should go from D.T.S.D.

R.M. Evans
 27 November, 1968.

I agree. We wrote.

A.R.17.
 28-11

~~N: McKinnon.~~

D.T.S.D. / Mr. Davidson
 Draft att'd JWG
 1/29/71

CONFIDENTIAL

29/11

11

NRQ 10/3

29 November, 1968

Red Top for Iraq

7
Thank you for sending us a copy of your letter
HU/151/010 of 14 November to Cliffe in DS 8, Ministry of
Defence.

The possible supply of Red Top is of course linked
with the possible sale of Lightnings, and is not likely
to arise in vacuo. It seems, therefore, preferable to
consider it with Lightnings; and, as you know, a decision
could only be made on the latter when the position is more
definite than it is at the moment. At this point, there-
fore, it is perhaps premature and slightly unreal to consider
Red Top alone.

I am copying this letter to the other members of the
Arms Working Party.

(J. A. Davidson)
Defence Training and Supply Department.

Miss J. Pike,
E.I.R. 2(b) 2,
Ministry of Technology,
Room 530,
Castlewood House,
London, W.C.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

Registry No. NEQ. 10/3

DRAFT letter

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~Top Secret~~

~~Secret~~

Confidential.

Restricted:

~~Unclassified~~

1/2/71

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

To:—

Mrs J. Pike
Ministry of Technology.
EIR 2 (6) 2
Room 530
Castlewood Ho.

From

Mr J. Gandon

Telephone No. & Ext. ~~2753~~

Department

D.T.S.D.

Red Top for Iraq

Thank you for sending
us a copy of your letter
HU/151/010 of 14 November
to Cliffe in D.S.B., Ministry
of Defence.

2) The ^{possible} supply of Red Top
is of course linked with the
possible sale of lightnings,
& is not likely to arise
in vacuo. It seems,

therefore preferable to consider
it with lightnings; & as
you know, ~~that~~ ^a decision
could only be made ^{on the latter} ~~when~~

~~if a firm order is
placed with B.A.C.~~

At this point ^{therefore} ~~it is perhaps~~ ^{over} ~~the~~ ^{signature}
it is perhaps ~~the~~ ^{signature}
slightly unreal to
consider Red Top alone.

3) I am copying this to
the ~~our~~ ^{new} ~~member~~ ^{of}
the ~~Anti~~ ^{Working} Party.


NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

56. The
solution
position is
more
definite
now it is
at the
moment



CONFIDENTIAL

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Main Building, Whitehall, LONDON S.W.1
Telephone: WHITEhall 7022, ext. 6279



Our reference D/DS13/178 Pt. II
Your reference: HU/151/07 and HU/151/011

29th November, 1968

Drop. Jm 9/12

Dear Mrs. Smith,

Proposal to offer Tigercat and Blowpipe to Iraq

The Air Force Department's views on the proposal outlined in your letter dated 17th October, 1968, are given below, but I must remind you that these relate only to the sale of Tigercat and Blowpipe. The maximum level of release of information permitted for Iraq under the RMIPC rules is "Restricted" and as it is known that both Tigercat and Blowpipe contain ~~information of~~ a higher classification, it would be necessary for you to submit "C" Forms seeking RMIPC approval to release information at a higher level before negotiating a contract.

TIGERCAT

There would be no AFD objection to the sale of Tigercat to Iraq provided that:

- (i) the RAF and RN frequencies were not used.
- (ii) no mention was made of ECCM facilities.
- (iii) as this missile is a development of the naval Seacat, Navy Department agreement is obtained.

I note that your letter was copied to Sales(N) who will presumably make known their views.

BLOWPIPE

This weapon is unlikely to enter service before mid-1973, and then not in the form in which it is now being exhibited. Therefore, it is unlikely that it will be reduced to "Restricted" level until some eighteen months after that date. This would rule out the possibility of opening a sales campaign in Iraq for six to seven years. This endorses the present view of the Army Department (their letter A/10/Clearances/2316 dated 29th October refers) but attention is drawn to the fact that Sales 5b(A) envisage selling Blowpipe to Iraq at an earlier date than that specified by the Air Force Department.

But see (9)
The Air Staff also wish it to be known that they have considerable reservations on general aspects of the sale of modern military equipment to countries such as Iraq, but they appreciate the importance of overseas sales and are prepared to accept the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's recommendation on the political implications of such sales.

I am copying this letter to Mr. D.J.S. Murray, F.C.O., Mr. C.A. Alldis (Sales(N)) and Mr. R.W. Browne, Sales(A).

Yours sincerely,

(Mrs.) J. M. SHEPHARD

(MRS. J. M. SHEPHARD)

Mrs. V. Smith,
Ministry of Technology (KIR2(B)2,
Castlewood House.

CF

L.H. 4DT



CONFIDENTIAL

MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

EIR.2b2, Room 530,

Castlewood House, 77-91 New Oxford Street

LONDON W.C.1

Telex: 22241 Telegrams: Mintec London Telex

Telephone: 01-636 3644, ext. 860

Our reference: HU/151/010

Your reference:

6th

December, 1968.

Mr. Murray
Enter, please.
11/12
Dr.
(13)

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVE 56
11 DEC 1968
NEQ 10/3

Dear

Red Top to Iraq *7*

Please refer to my letter of 14th November requesting AWP approval to the supply of Red Top to Iraq. Since writing this letter it has been decided that the supply of Red Top should be considered in conjunction with the supply of Lightning aircraft. A submission to the ESC(0) covering Lightning and Red Top will therefore be made by EIR.1 in the near future making consideration by the AWP now unnecessary.

p.a.
13/12

I am copying this letter to Mr. C.A. Alldis (MOD(N)), Mr. D. Murray (FCO) and all other members of the AWP.

Yours sincerely,

(MISS J. PIKE)

Mr. C.G. Warman,
DS.13,
Room 0217,
Main Building.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. M. H. Tallboys,
Ministry of Defence,
Head of DS.13,
Main Building,

Mr. O. J. Porter,
MOD(Central Staffs),
DS.13(c),
Main Building,

Mr. R. W. Browne,
Ministry of Defence Army Department,
Sales 5,
St. Christopher House,
S.E.1.

Mr. R. E. Adams,
Treasury,
S.W.1.

Mr. J. Doyle,
Department of Economic Affairs,
Overseas and General Division,
73/A Ground,
Stoneys Gate,
S.W.1.

Mr. J. Coates,
EIR.2c,

Mr. L. Savigar
EIR.1(c)

Mr. D. Church,
Board of Trade,
1-19 Victoria Street,
S.W.1.

Miss J. E. Stevens,
Board of Trade,
Hillgate House,
35 Old Bailey,
E.C.4.

Secretariat
Mr. G. Harman,
DS.13(c),
Main Building.

Mr. M. H. Tallboys,
Ministry of Defence,
Head of DS.13,
Main Building,

Mr. O. J. Porter,
MOD(Central Staffs),
DS.13(c),
Main Building,

Mr. R. W. Browne,
Ministry of Defence Army Department,
Sales 5,
St. Christopher House,
S.E.1.

Mr. R. E. Adams,
Treasury,
S.W.1.

Mr. J. Doyle,
Department of Economic Affairs,
Overseas and General Division,
73/A Ground,
Stoney's Gate,
S.W.1.

Mr. J. Coates,
EIR.2c,

Mr. L. Savigar
EIR.1(c)

Mr. D. Church,
Board of Trade,
1-19 Victoria Street,
S.W.1.

Miss J. E. Stevens,
Board of Trade,
Hillgate House,
35 Old Bailey,
E.C.4.

Secretariat
Mr. G. Warman,
DS.13(c),
Main Building.

D.T.S. Murray, Esq, F.C.O.

DS. Form 4



With the Compliments of



DS136

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Main Building, Whitehall

London, S.W.1.

Whitehall 7022

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.15

75 DEC 1968

NER 10/3

Defence Training & Supply Dept.

13 December, 1968

NEQ 10/3

(14)

Iraq: Tigercat and Blowpipe

(9)

Jim Davidson sent an interim reply (NEQ 10/3 of 21 November) to your letter HU/151/07; HU/151/011 of 17 October, which had been overtaken by the veto in Ken Nutting's letter from M.O.D. Sales 5(b)A.

(2)

(12)

2. The matter seems to have been raised again by the final paragraph of Mrs. Shepherd's letter D/DS13/178 Pt.II of 29 November from DS 13B M.O.D. As you know, however, we are prevented from agreeing in advance of a specific request to purchase, though not of course prevented from veto-ing in advance on certain specified grounds.

3. I suggest therefore that your reply to the query in the final paragraph of your letter should be that while we can not give an answer in advance of a definite order by the Iraqis, present indications are that an export licence would be unlikely to be approved.

4. You will appreciate that it would be preferable if any forecast of political conditions (your para. 1) would be cleared with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in advance rather than after making it.

(D. J. S. MURRAY)

Mrs. V. Smith,
EIR 2 B2,
Ministry of Technology,
Castlewood House,
W.C.1

Copied to: G. G. Warman, Esq., M.O.D.
C. A. Allie, Esq., M.O.D.
L. A. Savin, Esq., Minter.
D. J. Church, Esq., B.O.D.
R. J. E. Stevens, B.O.D.

R. E. Adams, Esq., Treasury
J. Doyle, Esq., D.E.A.
K. W. Nutting, Esq., M.O.D.

20

W14

To:—

From

~~Secret~~

Confidential.

Resistant

Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

...In Confidence

Mrs V. Smith

EIR 2 B2

Ministry of Technology
Castlewood Ho.

FROM
D. Murray
Telephone No. & Ext.

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

3780

42 DEC 1968

Tray: Tigris & Blowpipe

Jim Davidson sent an
 interim reply (NB 10/3 of
 21 Nov) to your ~~the~~ letter
 HU/151/07 : HU/151/011 of 17 Oct,
 which had been overtaken
 by the veto in ~~MOD~~ Ken
 Nutting's letter from MOD
 Sales (~~5-B A~~) 5.(b) A.

2. The matter seems to have been raised again by ~~the~~ the final paragraph of Mr Shepherd's letter of 10/13/178. Pt II of 29 Nov Rem OS ^{13.B} ~~13.B~~ mod₂. As ~~you~~ ~~that~~ ~~we~~ know, however, we are prevented from agreeing in advance of a specific request to purchase, though not in

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN


of course. prevented
from veto-ing ^{in advance} on certain
specified grounds.

3. The ~~political department~~
involved have pointed out
to me that they are
unable to forecast

3. I suggest therefore that
your reply to the query
in the final paragraph of your
letter should be that ^{while} we ~~will~~
~~can~~ not give an ^{affirmative} answer
in advance of a ~~the~~ request
~~firm~~ ^{definite} order by the Trips, ~~but~~
that present indications are
that an export licence would
be unlikely to be approved.

4. You will appreciate
that ^{it would be preferable if} any forecast of political
conditions ^{collected} shared
with the Foreign & Commonwealth
Office ^{in advance} ~~before~~ rather than
after making it.

5. I am copying —

 10/12

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

From: K. W. Nutting, Sales 5b(A)

CONFIDENTIAL


MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 17/1

St. Christopher House, Southwark Street,

LONDON S.E.1

Telephone 01-928 7999, Ext 4237

Our ref: A/10/Clearances/2316
 Your ref: HU/151/07 HU/151/011

16th January 1969

Please refer to my letter of even number dated 29th October 1968 about the supply of Tigercat and Blowpipe to Iraq.

The General Staff have now seen a copy of Mrs Shephards letter D/DS 13/178 Pt II dated 29th November 1968. In view of the fact that the Air Force Department do not object, subject to certain conditions, to the supply of Tigercat they have withdrawn their previous objections to the supply of this weapon to Iraq.

Yours sincerely,

K. W. NUTTING

Mrs V. Smith
 Ministry of Technology EIR 2 B2
 Stuart House
 23/25 Soho Square
 London W.1

Copies for information to:

C. G. Warman Esq
 C. A. Alldis Esq
 D. J. S. Murray Esq
 L. A. Savigar Esq
 D. E. Church Esq
 Miss J. E. Stevens
 R. E. Adams Esq
 J. Doyle Esq

Ministry of Defence, DS 13(b)
 Ministry of Defence, Sales 1(N)
 Foreign Office, DT & SD
 Ministry of Technology, EIR 1
 Board of Trade, (XP)
 Board of Trade, (ELB)
 HM Treasury
 Department of Economic Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

KLS

L.H.30D



CONFIDENTIAL

MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

EIR2B2

Stuart House, 23-25 Soho Square, LONDON W.1

Telex: 22241 Telegrams: Mintec London Telex

Telephone: 01-437 9288, ext. 140

Jan 28/1

Our reference: HU/151/07

Your reference:

22nd January, 1969

Reg & submit w. pp.

missiles file

Dear David,

Tigercat - Iraq

Further to the voluminous correspondence on this subject, the position envisaged in para. 3 of your letter of 13th December, 1968 has now been reached as may be seen from the attached copy of a letter from the Iraqi Directorate of Contracts in their Ministry of Defence to Short Bros. and Harland Ltd.

As I understand it there are now no Service objections to the supply of Tigercat to Iraq under the restrictions listed in the correspondence.

Would you now please say if there is or is not any F.C.O. objection to the supply of Tigercat (a purely defensive weapon) to Iraq.

Yours *lms*

Stuart Addison

Mr. D. J. S. Murray
Defence Training and Supply Dept.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1

S. ADDISON

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.15
28 JAN 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NEQ 10/3

((سرى الكفافي))

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

مد بومة الحقوق والبيانات

DIRECTORATE OF CONTRACTS & PURCHASES
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
BAGHDAD, IRAQ.

SHORT BROTHERS & HARLAND LTD.
PRECISION ENGINEERING DIVISION
7
6197
COMMERCIAL MANAGERS
OFFICE

الرقم / مفتاحه / ٢١٢

التاريخ ١٩٦٨/١٢/٣١

Our Ref : Inquiry/1212

Date : 31st Dec., 1968

الى / - شركة شورت برنوردز - ارلنده

Messrs:

SHORT BROTHERS & HARLAND LTD.,
CASTLEREACH
BELFAST -
NORTHERN IRELAND

بعد التحية :

Dear Sirs,

اننا نرغب بشراء المواد المدرجة في الجبهة
المقابلة باللغة الانكليزية

We are interested in purchasing the
materills listed down below:-

Rockets. Description

1. BLOW PIPE 2. TIGER SEA 3. TIGER CAT

نرجو ان تتم هذه العملية بيننا ودون وساطة
طرف ثالث ونؤكد ان الاسعار المقدمة اليها
من جانبكم ينبغي ان تكون خالية من عمولة
الوسطاء. نرجو مراعاة وصول عطاءكم خلال
شهر واحد من التاريخ اعلاه.

We hope that this deal will be executed
between us without any third party int-
erfering. We confirm that the prices
submitted to us by you should not incl-
ude any commission. Please make sure we
receive your offer within one month from
the above date.

نرجو تزويدنا بانسب الاسعار طبقا لشروطنا
العامة في الشراء - راء البرقة طبعها.
كما نرجو ان تزودونا بالتفاصيل القيمة
الكاملة لهذه الصواريخ.

Please quote us with your keenest prices
according to our general conditions of
purchasing enclosed herewith. Also please
furnish us with full Technical details
relating the above said rockets.

Awaiting your earliest reply, we are,

Yours faithfully,

MAHMUD A. AL-KHAFAT
BRIGADIER,

DIRECTOR OF CONTRACTS & PURCHASES

Encl.

Copy of general conditions of purchasing

NOTE: SEND US YOUR OFFER BY REGISTERED
AIRMAIL

صورة منه الى / -

دائرة الاركان العامة

مد بومة الحركات العسكرية / كتابكم السرى للغاية وعلى الفور ٧٧٢٤ في ١٢/١٢/٦٨

الملحق العسكري في لندن

الكتاب اعلاه راجع الاتصال بالشركة اعلاه من جانبكم
وحثها على ارسال عطاياها بالمواد الحرجة
بالسرعة الممكنة واعلامنا

١٩٦٨

SECRET

Reference.....

Mr. Tripp

Ray Mante. I agree.

98 11.2.

Tigercat for Iraq

I now attach a draft submission prepared by Mr. Hinchcliffe and to which I have added a few points.

A. A. Acland

(A. A. Acland)

11 February, 1969

SECRET

Registry No.		SECRET Submission		Type 1 +	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		To:—		From	
Top Secret. Secret. Confidential. Restricted. Unclassified.		Mr. Arthur		Mr. Tripp Telephone No. & Ext. Department	
PRIVACY MARKING					
In Confidence					
Flag A		<p align="center"><u>Tigercat for Iraq</u></p> <p><u>Problem</u></p> <p>We have been asked by the Ministry of Technology if there are any objections to the sale of Iraq of Tigercat missiles. The Iraqi Ministry of Defence is at present negotiating on orders with Short Brothers and Harland, which could be worth up to £4 million. The best present estimate of delivery is 14 months from signature of contract, although this might be improved.</p> <p><u>Recommendation</u></p> <p>2. I recommend that we should inform the Ministry of Technology that we have no objection to the sale. Defence Training and Supply Department and Arabian Department concur.</p> <p><u>Argument</u></p> <p>3. Tigercat is a ground to air missile which has been in service for some seven years. It is a purely defensive weapon, normally associated with the protection of airfields.</p> <p>4. The principles which govern decisions we make on the supply of such items of military equipment to the Arab states are set out in paper (OPD(67)78) which the former Secretary of State submitted to the Defence and Overseas Policy committee in November 1967. The principles relevant in this case</p> <p align="right">/are that</p>			
Flag B					

are that:

- (a) We should continue to have regard to the effective balance of forces in the area (Middle East) in all our decisions about arms supplies;
- (b) We should as far as possible avoid supplying arms of greater offensive power than those already employed in the area and ~~we~~ we should not supply arms which are exclusively offensive in character;
- (c) We should examine particularly closely the supply of arms to Arab countries which maintain a hostile attitude towards us.

Agreement on our part to supply Iraq with Tigercat would not conflict with principles (a) and (b). This missile is a defensive weapon and we have already agreed to the supply to Jordan and to the Lebanon. Arabian Department do not think that the Kuwaitis would seriously object. The Saudis would be deeply suspicious of our motives but have adequate armaments themselves. The Iranians, given their own existing equipment and likely future purchases would not be worried. It would, however, be necessary to send guidance to H.M. Embassies concerned if and when the deal is finalised. (c) is more difficult. The Iraqi regime although it has not been consistently hostile towards us has shown an attitude which has been anything but helpful. ~~to Great Britain.~~ They have been abusive about Western imperialism; they have been /persistently

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Flag C

persistently obstructive to the Iraqi Petroleum Company; and they have reacted hysterically to the ~~external~~ widespread criticism of the recent trials and executions, the backlash of which has been mainly anti-British as exemplified by the demonstration outside our Embassy in Baghdad, and by the recent hostile tone of the Iraqi press and radio.

6. Thus, at an official level Anglo/Iraqi relations are at the lowest point since the re-opening of our Embassy last May. However, the situation has eased in Baghdad and although fresh trials are probable the Iraqi conduct of them may be more moderate and thus less likely to evoke the same hostile reaction here and abroad. H.M. Ambassador is of the view that although relations are strained at a governmental level we should still be able to do business in the commercial and military fields. It is likely therefore that the withholding of our permission to the sale of these missiles would achieve little besides adding to the present régime's persecution complex and putting a fresh strain on Anglo/Iraqi relations. The Iraqis would not doubt turn elsewhere for supplies and be able to obtain comparable equipment.

7. It would be unfortunate and could cause a public reaction here if news of the sale coincided with another period of anti-British activity on the part of the Iraqis. This is, however, a constant hazard and would not on its own justify withholding approval for a

/valuable

valuable contract.

Background

8. The question of whether or not we should supply Tigercat to Iraq arose last October. The General Staff, when it was thought possible that Iraq wished to purchase Tigercat together with Blowpipe, would not agree to the supply of these weapons to Iraq on operational grounds but subsequently withdrew their veto in the case of Tigercat in view of the fact That the Air Force Department saw no objection to the sale subject to certain conditions being imposed.

Flags D, E, & F

9/5
11.2 ✓

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

SECRET

Reference.....



Mr. Tripp

Ray Mante. I agree.

98 11.2.

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I now attach a draft submission prepared by Mr. Hinchcliffe and to which I have added a few points.

A. A. Acland

(A. A. Acland)

11 February, 1969

SECRET


SECRET

17

Minister of State

Mr. Arthur

Tigercat for Iraq



Problem

Flag A

We have been asked by the Ministry of Technology if there are any objections to the sale to Iraq of Tigercat missiles. The Iraqi Ministry of Defence is at present negotiating on orders with Short Brothers and Harland, which could be worth up to £4 million. The best present estimate of delivery is 14 months from signature of contract, although this might be improved.

Recommendation

2. I recommend that we should inform the Ministry of Technology that we have no objection to the sale. Defence Training and Supply Department and Arabian Department concur.

Argument

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4. The principles which govern decisions we make on the supply of such items of military equipment to the Arab states are set out in paper (OPD(67)78) which the former Secretary of State submitted to the Defence and Overseas Policy committee in November 1967. The principles relevant in this case are that:

Flag B

(a) We should continue to have regard to the effective balance of forces in the area

/Middle ...

SECRET

(Middle East) in all our decisions about arms supplies;

(b) We should as far as possible avoid supplying arms of greater offensive power than those already employed in the area and we should not supply arms which are exclusively offensive in character;

(c) We should examine particularly closely the supply of arms to Arab countries which maintain a hostile attitude towards us.

5. Agreement on our part to supply Iraq with Tigercat would not conflict with principles (a) and (b). This missile is a defensive weapon and we have already agreed to the supply to Jordan and to the Lebanon. Arabian Department do not think that the Kuwaitis would seriously object. The Saudis would be deeply suspicious of our motives but have adequate armaments themselves. The Iranians, given their own existing equipment and likely future purchases would not be worried. It would however be necessary to send guidance to H.M. Embassies concerned if and when the deal is finalised. (c) is more difficult. The Iraqi regime, although it has not been consistently hostile towards us, has shown an attitude which has been anything but helpful. They have been abusive about Western imperialism; they have persistently been obstructive to the Iraq Petroleum Company; and they have reacted hysterically to the wide-

/spread ...

spread criticism of the recent trials and executions, the backlash of which has been mainly anti-British as exemplified by the demonstration outside our Embassy in Baghdad, and by the recent hostile tone of the Iraqi press and radio.

6. Thus, at an official level Anglo/Iraqi relations are at the lowest point since the re-opening of our Embassy last May. However, the situation has eased in Baghdad and although fresh trials are probable, the Iraqi conduct of them may be more moderate and thus less likely to evoke the same hostile reaction here and abroad. H.M. Ambassador is of the view that although relations are strained at a governmental level we should still be able to do business in the commercial and military fields. It is likely therefore that the withholding of our permission to the sale of these missiles would achieve little besides adding to the present régime's persecution complex and putting a fresh strain on Anglo/Iraqi relations. The Iraqis would no doubt turn elsewhere for supplies and be able to obtain comparable equipment.

7. It would be unfortunate and could cause a public reaction here if news of the sale coincided with another period of anti-British activity on the part of the Iraqis. This is, however, a constant hazard and would not on its own justify withholding approval for a valuable contract.

Flag C

Background

8. The question of whether or not we should supply Tigercat
/to Iraq ...

SECRET

-4-

to Iraq arose last October. The General Staff, when it was thought possible that Iraq wished to purchase Tigercat together with Blowpipe, would not agree to the supply of these weapons to Iraq on operational grounds but subsequently withdrew their veto in the case of Tigercat in view of the fact that the Air Force Department saw no objection to the sale subject to certain conditions being imposed.

Flags D,
E & F

J. P. Tripp

(J. P. Tripp)
Near Eastern Dept.
12 February, 1969

I have no objection to the sale of Tigercat to Iraq. But we refused to sell this equipment to the Egyptians last autumn, on what I understood were security grounds (but which I suspect was pure anti-Egyptian sentiment in MOD). I therefore held up this submission in the attempt to get out of the MOD a reasoned statement as to why it was inadvisable to sell Tigercat to the Iraqis (who also have a Russian training team) and not to the U.A.R. The MOD have failed to answer the enquiry satisfactorily, and the release of Tigercat to the Iraqis is now an urgent problem, since the Iraq Embassy are

SECRET

/to

Secret

to discuss the question with Shook tomorrow.

2. I recommend that we should tell HQ that we can give FCO clearance to the supply of Tigercat to Iraq, but only on condition that the supply of this and similar equipments to the OAR is reconsidered.

R. L. Ames
4/3

Memorandum of State (Mr. Roberts)

I agree with the recommendation

I don't think we should make a
condition as in Mr. Arthur's (2) but
we shd press hard to restrict supply
to U.A.R.

fu
4/3

Mr. Trapp

9.8.53.

Mr. Deland ~~AM~~ 6/3

~~Mr. Deland~~

Mr. Hinchcliff ~~PM~~ 14/3

Enter

CONFIDENTIAL

NEQ 10/3

copy

From: A. Miller, Sales 5(b)(A)



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

St. Christopher House, Southwark Street

 LONDON S.E.1
 Telephone: 01-928 7999 Ext 3629

Our ref: 10/Clearances/1598

NEQ 6/11 February, 1969

1A/327 and 1A/328/69

We have again consulted the General Staff on the question of the export to Iraq of the portable field trainers for use with the Cobra anti-tank guided missile. They have no objection to this export.

The Cobra equates to our own Malkara which has been obsolescent for 2 years now. The provision of a portable field trainer for Cobra would not therefore increase the Iraqi anti-tank capability to any extent which would worry us.

Yours sincerely,

(SGD) A. Miller

Miss J.E. Stevens
 Export Licensing Branch
 Board of Trade
 Hillgate House.

Copies for information to:

C.G. Warman Esq	MOD, DS 13(b)
C.A. Alldis Esq	" Sales 1(N)
D.J.S. Murray Esq	Foreign Office, DT & SD
L.A. Savigar Esq	Mintech, EIR 1
J. Coates Esq	" " 2
D.E. Church Esq	Board of Trade, (XP)
R.E. Adams Esq	HM Treasury
J. Doyle Esq	Dept of Economic Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

PMH 14/2 m 13 1/2
in Hindcliffe
Register

SECRET

Mr. Tripp
Thank you. I have
sent a memo to

(19)

Mr. Tripp

Arms for Iraq

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No 15 13.2 FILED 1003 NEQ 10/3.
--

Mr. Arthur has asked:

- (a) whether there are Russian technicians and instructors with the Iraqi forces.
- (b) on what grounds Tigercat was refused for the U.A.R.

2. On (a) Mr. Makinson is pretty sure that there are Russian instructors with the Iraqi forces and that the Russians would have access to Iraqi equipment. We are trying to check urgently with the departments concerned what the latest assessment is on this point.

3. As regards Tigercats for the U.A.R., Sir D. Allen agreed on 14 November 1968 to let the matter rest largely because of the Air Staff's "total opposition to the sale of this weapon to the U.A.R.", as reported in a letter from the Ministry of Technology. The exact reason for the opposition was not stated, but the letter in question points out that the sale would have required the release of "restricted" information on Tigercat to the U.A.R. The implication is that Security considerations played an important part in the decision.

4. As indicated in the recent submission on Tigercats for Iraq, the Air Department originally had reservations but recently withdrew these.

5. The Kuwaitis do not have Tigercat but General Hall's report which was accepted by the Chiefs of Staff recommended that they should be allowed Rapier if they decide to ask for it. We have also sold, or are prepared to do so, Tigercat to Jordan and Lebanon.

A.A. Acland

(A. A. Acland)
13 February, 1969

As regards a), there are thought to be :-

210 Russian technicians / instructors / advisors
with the Army / Navy (few in Navy)

40 with Airforce

There are 750 Russian civilians not associated with the forces.

SECRET

PMH 17/2
AAA 13 1/2

SECRET

Mr. Dyer
Mr. A. J. 13/2
Mr. H. J. 1/2
PMMH

Mr. Crosthwait

Tigercat for Iraq

Near Eastern Department have submitted a recommendation, which is with me at present, that we should inform the Ministry of Technology that we have no objection to the sale to Iraq of up to £4 million worth of Tigercat missiles. Your Department have concurred in the recommendation.

2. One element in the argument is that, because the Air Force Department did not object to the supply, subject to certain conditions, the "General Staff" have withdrawn their previous objections (see letter from Mr. K. W. Nutting, Ministry of Defence Sales 5b(A) to Mrs. V. Smith Ministry of Technology EIR II, copied to Mr. D. J. S. Murray in D.T. & S. Department).

3. On 3 September, with the approval of the Minister of State, the Ministry of Defence were asked to carry out an early security study with a view to releasing Tigercat to the U.A.R. (Mr. Speares' letter to Brigadier Sherman Ministry of Defence VK 10/11 of 3 September). On 31 October 1968 Miss V. Smith of the Ministry of Technology wrote to Brigadier Sherman, copying to Mr. Speares, that "at present the Air Staff are utterly opposed to the sale of this weapon to the U.A.R.; there is therefore no point in releasing information about it." This proposed sale was therefore not pursued further.

14.

SECRET

1A
PMMH
712

SECRET


4. Can I take it that the Ministry of Defence have now withdrawn their objection to the sale of Tigercat to the U.A.R. as well as to Iraq? If so, well and good, If not, I should like to see a paper setting out the grounds on which they consider it proper to release Tigercat to Iraq but not to the U.A.R. I am meanwhile holding up the submission on Tigercat for Iraq.

(G. G. ARTHUR)
13 February, 1969.

c.c. Mr. Tripp
Mr. Speares

SECRET

SECRET



Mr. Crosthwait

Tigercat for Iraq

Flag L
Near Eastern Department have submitted a recommendation, which is with me at present, that we should inform the Ministry of Technology that we have no objection to the sale to Iraq of up to £4 million worth of Tigercat missiles. Your Department have concurred in the recommendation.

Flag O
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Flag 7
Flag I
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/4.

SECRET

SECRET

4. Can I take it that the Ministry of Defence have now withdrawn their objection to the sale of Tigercat to the U.A.R. as well as to Iraq? If so, well and good, If not, I should like to see a paper setting out the grounds on which they consider it proper to release Tigercat to Iraq but not to the U.A.R. I am meanwhile holding up the submission on Tigercat for Iraq.



(G. G. ARTHUR)
13 February, 1969.

c.c. Mr. Tripp
Mr. Speares

SECRET



Your reference:

Any communication on the
subject of this letter should be
addressed to:
THE SECRETARY
and the following reference quoted:

HU/130/06
A/57 O'Scas/1149


Copy Original on
CONFIDENTIAL

NAU 10/4

MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY
E.I.R.2B2

Castlewood House, 77-91 New Oxford Street
LONDON W.C.1

Telex: 22241 Telegrams: Mintec London Telex
Telephone: 01-636 3644, ext.



31st October, 1968

Dear Brigadier Sherman,

UAR -Tigercat

✓K10/11 (77)

10/11 (72) Please refer to your letter of 6th September, 1968
(enclosing a copy of Mr. D.J. Speares letter to you of
3rd September 1968) about the supply of Tigercat to UAR.

As requested we raised a 'C' Form (CGW(C)46/S.178)
to cover release to UAR of "restricted" information on
Tigercat. At present the Air Staff are totally opposed
to the sale of this weapon to the UAR; there is therefore
no point in releasing information about it. Consequently
RMIPC have refused our 'C' Form application.

A copy of this letter goes to Mr. D.J. Speares at the
N.E.A. Dept. of the Foreign Office for information.

Yours sincerely,

V. Smith.

Brigadier C.J.C. Sherman,
AEP1(c),
M.O.D.,
Whitehall, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

P/D 3 September 68.

Copy Original on V.K. 10/11

22

SECRET

FOREIGN OFFICE,
S.W.1.

VK 10/11

3 September, 1968

In his letter VK 10/11 of 12 August Philip Mallet told you that General Abdul Munim Riad, Chief of Staff of the U.A.R. Armed Forces, is interested in acquiring Tigercat surface-to-air guided missiles.

2. As was recommended by H.M. Ambassador in Cairo (Cairo telegram No. 775 copied to you), F.O. Ministers have now agreed that we should pursue this enquiry further, and I would therefore be very grateful if an early security study could be put in hand with a view to releasing Tigercat to the U.A.R.

(D.J. Speares)

Brigadier C.J.C. Sherman,
A.E.P.1c,
Ministry of Defence,
S.W.1.

Copied to:

DS 13(a) MOD
DDOR6(A) RAF MOD
M.O.I./Major Gray MOD (Army)
Sales 2b(A) MOD (Army)
SO/RAF to MD/HDS - MOD

SECRET

"C" Form action complete. Prospect
later good reply did & in within week.
P1 B2
18/10.

No noted
reply yet.
P1 B2
11/11
Refined.
P.A.
18/11
12/10.

18 February, 1969

NRQ 10/3

Supply of Tigercat to Iraq

As you know there has recently been considerable correspondence about the supply to Iraq of a ~~84~~ m. Tigercat Missile System; and Nutting's letter of 16 January indicated that there was no longer any Ministry of Defence objection to this supply.

2. Since then Addison in the Ministry of Technology has been in touch with us to confirm the Foreign and Commonwealth Office position on this supply; and this enquiry has been submitted to higher authority within the office, and a decision is under consideration.

3. In the meantime we have, however, been asked if it can be taken that the Ministry of Defence have now withdrawn their objection to the sale of Tigercat to the U.A.R. as well as Iraq. (On the question of the supply to the U.A.R. the position rests at present with the letter of 31 October from Miss Smith at the Ministry of Technology to Brigadier Sherman, Ministry of Defence which appeared to close the door firmly against following up U.A.R. interest in Tigercat).

4. If it is the position that the Ministry of Defence no longer have any objection to the sale of Tigercat to the U.A.R. perhaps you would let us know. If, however, there is still objection to such supply it would be helpful to our consideration in relation to the supply to Iraq if we could have a brief note setting out the grounds on which it is considered proper to release the System to Iraq but not to the U.A.R.

5. I am sending a copy of this letter to Addison, Ministry of Technology ~~2b2~~ 2b2.

(J. A. Davidson)
Defence Training and Supply Department.

M. H. Tallboys, Esq.,
DS 13,
Ministry of Defence,
Main Building.

Registry
No.

10/3
N62

DRAFT

LETTER

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

To:—

M.H. Tallboys, Esq.,
DS 13,
Ministry of Defence
Main Building.

From

J.A. Davidson

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

Defence Proc.

Supply Dept

Supply of Tigercat to Iraq

As you know there has recently been considerable correspondence about the supply to Iraq of a 24 m. Tigercat Missile System; and Nutting's letter of 16 January indicated that there was no longer any ~~Ministry of Defence~~ ^{Ministry of Defence} ~~objection~~ ^{objection} to this supply.

2. Since then Addison in the Ministry of Technology has been in touch with us to confirm the ~~Ministry of Technology~~ ^{Ministry of Technology} position on this supply; and this enquiry has been submitted to higher authority within the office, and a decision is under consideration.

3. In the meantime we have, however, been asked if it can be taken that the Ministry of Defence have now withdrawn their objection to the sale of Tigercat to the U.A.R. as well as Iraq. (On the question of the supply to the UAR the position ~~as recently as 31 October~~ ^{as recently as 31 October}, ~~when~~ ^{when} Miss Smith, Ministry of Technology ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~written~~ ^{written} to Brigadier Sherman Ministry of Defence ~~indicated that there was no point in even considering the Tigercat sale to the UAR~~ ^{indicated that there was no point in even considering the Tigercat sale to the UAR}).

4. If, ~~however~~ ^{it is the position that} the Ministry of Defence ~~have~~ ^{no longer}

Copy to

S. Addison

M.of.Tech.

Ministry of Technology

File

Sydney

rest of
process
with the letter
of 31 October
from

which
appeared to
close the
down finally
agreed
following up

U.A.R. request
in Tigercat

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

~~obj~~
have objection to the sale of TigerCat
to the U.A.R. ~~it would be useful to us~~
if we could have a brief note setting out
the grounds on which it is considered
proper to release the System to Iraq
but not to the U.A.R.

5. I am sending a copy of this letter
to Addison ~~at the~~ Ministry of Technology
E.I.R.2b2.

perhaps you
would let
us know.


If however
remains still
objection
to such
supply it
should be
helpful to
our consideration
in relation
to the
supply to
Iraq

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Secret.Mr. Casthwaunt (DTSD)TIGERCAT.

You may remember that I am holding up a submission on Tigercat for Iraq until we have cleared up the position in relation to the export of Tigercat (and similar equipment) to Egypt.

2. Any news yet, please?


(ARTHUR)

22 Feb 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

~~DM~~ 19/2
The ~~Ad~~land.



R.E.




Mr. Evans,
Near Eastern Dept.

18/2

M. Hindcliffe
Survey

With the compliments of

DEFENCE TRAINING AND SUPPLY
DEPARTMENT



ANN
19/2

FOREIGN and COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
LONDON, S.W.1.

SECRET

Mr. Crosthwait

Reference.....

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 15 27 FEB 1969 NEQ 10/3.
--

(23)

Tigercat

Mr. Arthur's Minute below.

2. I wrote last week to DS 13 (copy attached) linking Tigercat to Iraq (accepted by the Ministry of Defence), with Tigercat to the UAR (not accepted). Since then we have been in touch with DS 13 to hasten a reply. But the response is that the Air Staff are unable to give a snap decision: the matter has to go to a number of departments. (Possibly because of the risk of the UAR using Tigercat against us should we ever have to defend Libya against them).

3. DS 13 hoped however to be able to let us have an answer within a week or so. (But may perhaps be underestimating the security hoops). In the meantime I wonder if the go-ahead should not be given to the Iraq business with the UAR question being looked at again when we have received the note we have requested.

J. A. Davidson

(J. A. Davidson)
Defence Training and Supply Dept.
24 February, 1969.

Mr. Arthur

Please see Mr. Davidson's minute above.

In view of the implications of a Tigercat deployment for our own forces the Air Staff understandably do not want to hurried over this.

R. Crosthwait

24.2.69

Thank you.

2. I am not prepared to go ahead over Tigercat for Iraq until I have been satisfied over the U.A.R. If I am not satisfied, I shall

SECRET

Mr. Crossin's

11/2/52

Mr. Arthur's Minute below.

recommend against supply to Iraq.

2/25/52

The Tripp 2/25/52

Mr. Crossin

Mr. Davidson

2/26/52. Please keep up the pressure on I.D.

2/27

Defence Training and Supply Dept.
24 February, 1953

CONFIDENTIAL

Defence Supply and Training Department,

24

26 February 1969

(REQ 10/5)

21

Middle East: Tigercat

I am sorry to be bothering you again so soon after my 18 February letter on Tigercat in the Middle East. But we really are under some pressure to provide either:-

(a) a note that the Ministry of Defence no longer have objection to the sale of Tigercat to the U.A.R.;

or

(b) a note briefly setting out the grounds on which the Ministry of Defence have considered it proper to release Tigercat to Iraq but not to the UAR.

2. I am sending a copy of this letter to Addison, Ministry of Technology, EIR 2 B 2.

(J.A. Davidson)

M.H. Tallboys, Esq.,

D.S. 18,

Ministry of Defence.

CONFIDENTIAL


CONFIDENTIAL
Enter, please
4/11
25

EIR2b1


HU/151/04

303

A/10/Clearances/1599



3rd. March, 1969



Dear

(4) VIGILANT - IRAQ

In November, 1968, the General Staff objected on operational grounds to the supply of Vigilant to Iraq - your letter of 12th November.

It is essential that this matter should be reviewed since British Aircraft Corporation have now informed us that there are prospects of an order from the Iraqis worth £2M.

I am copying this letter to all members of the A.W.P. for information; in a recent telephone conversation with Mr. Vernall, Mr. Hinchcliffe of F.C.O. confirmed that there would be no objection politically.

Yours

(Olive J. Thompson)

Mr. K.W. Nutting,
Sales 5b,
Army Dept.,
St. Christopher House,
London, S.E.1.

Thank you - Minute & draft
422-1283
Mr. Nutting. 6/11
LEJORE
+ 203

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Para 3 is ruled. I have made it clear to Mrs Thompson that we are not yet in a position to give a formal ruling nor will we be until we are asked to at the "point of sale" position. Vernall must have misunderstood what I said on the telephone. I have now written Mrs Thompson who has promised to contact the latter and inform Nutting and the other members of the AWP of the current position.

PMM H 5/3

Mr. O.J. Porter,
D.S.13b

M.O.D., Main Bldg., Whitehall

Mrs. J.M. Shephard
D.S.13b

CONFIDENTIAL

Miss L.B. Cramer
Navy Sales Div.,
Old Admiralty

→ Mr. D.J.S. Murray,
Defence Supply and Training Section,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
Downing St.

Mr. D. Church,
Board of Trade,
Victoria Street, S.W.1.

Miss J.E. Stevens,
Board of Trade,
Hillgate Ho.,
35 Old Bailey, E.C.4.

Mr. J. Doyle,
Dept. of Economic Affairs,
Storey's Gate, S.W.1.

Mr. J.A. Patterson,
Treasury,
Whitehall, S.W.1.

E.I.R.2(c) - Mr. J. Coates

E.I.R.1(c) - Mr. L. Savigar

Mr. Hinchcliffe, New Eastern Dept.

Vigilant - Drage

I spoke to Mrs. Thomson this morning 6 March. She said that she did not intend to write a correction to her letter at (25) because she had telephoned Mr. Muttig who took the view that as the General Staff were in fact the objectors to his transaction, the question of political approval was academic.

2. It is essential, in my view, to set the record straight in all A.V.P. files lest the erroneous impression given by (25) be quoted against us later. I accordingly attach a draft, which please alter as you wish.

6 Mar 69

J. T. S. J.

Mr Murray DTSD

I agree. I have suggested one insertion which makes it clear that your letter seems less of a rebuff (by implication) to me! We don't want to give AWP the impression that DTSD & NEO are not of the same level as the misunderstanding, especially one out of which we have been by Venables.

PMM Hill

NEP 7.3.69.

Draft to come please.

CYPHER

26

PRIORITY

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.15
10 MAR 1969
NEQ 10/3

David
Ne

Xerox + 7

CYPHER/CAT 'A'

PRIORITY CAIRO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 261120Z

TO MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

DATED 26 FEBRUARY 1969

Distributed to
~~M.O.D. (3)~~
Hd. of Defence Policy Dept.
Defence Policy Dept.
Defence Training & Supply Dept.
Hd. of P.U.S.D.
P.U.S.D.
Military Staff
W North Dept.
Hd. of Comms. Dept.
Examines
File: Distribution Selectors.
Inform Registrar.

SECRET UK EYES ONLY.

ADDRESSED TO M O D TELNO. EDO 261120Z FEB.

FOR GEN. HALL FROM DEFENCE ATTACHE.

L
YOUR TEEGRAM EDO 250925Z FEB IS NOT ENTIRELY UNDERSTOOD. I HAVE
ALREADY TOLD UAR AUTHORITIES THAT RAPIER AND TIGER CAT ARE NOT
AVAILABLE AND THERE HAS BEEN NO REQUEST FOR THUNDERBIRD OR AA GUNS
THROUGH ME. I HOPE YOUR TELEGRAM DOES NOT REFER TO CAIRO TELNO.
142 OF 12 FEBRUARY TO WHICH YOU SENT AN ENCOURAGING INTERIM REPLY
IN YOUR WWW/TOB OF 131135Z FEB. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR
CLARIFICATION.

F C O PASS PRIORITY DEFENCE COMCEN FOR M O D.

SIR R. BEAUMONT

SENT AT 0740Z 1/3/69

RECD AT 0916Z 1/3/69

SENT TO D.C.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: M.H. Tallboys, Head of DS13.



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Main Building, Whitehall, LONDON S.W.1
Telephone: WHITEhall 7022, ext. 6855

(27)

Our reference: D/DS13/180 (Pt II)
Your reference:

3rd March, 1969

13/3.
Dear Jim,

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.15 10 MAR 1969 NEQ 10/3
--

Middle East - Tigercat

(21) (24)
We spoke this morning and you again asked me for an urgent reply to your letters of 18th and 26th February on this subject. What follows is an interim statement of the position.

2. As your letter of 18th February records, the supply of Tigercat to UAR was last formally considered in October and firmly rejected.
3. We have taken soundings once again within the Ministry of Defence and although we have not finally decided our position the indications are that we shall maintain our objection to the sale of Tigercat to the UAR. As you will be aware from Table X the standard rule is that no classified information may be supplied to the UAR. We cannot agree to the supply of Tigercat without a breach of this rule.
4. As you know we have agreed to the supply of Tigercat to Iraq in the light of all the considerations but you will note that the standard rule for release of information to Iraq is less restricted than in the case of UAR.

Yours sincerely,
M.H. Tallboys

J. Davidson, Esq.,
Defence Supply and Training Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
London, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG
PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 227

28
NEQ 10/2.
Gry for NEQ 10/3.
TO BAGHDAD
5 MARCH 1969. (NE)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 227 OF 5 MARCH REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION SAVING TO CAIRO ALGIERS BAHRAIN BEIRUT AMMAN
JEDDA KHARTOUM KUWAIT RABAT TEL AVIV TRIPOLI TUNIS UKMIS NEW YORK
WASHINGTON

YOUR TELEGRAM NOS. 249, 250 AND 254 (NOT TO ALL):

ARMS FOR IRAQ.

APPROVAL HAS NOW BEEN GIVEN FOR THE SALE OF TIGERCAT TO IRAQ.
SHORTS, WHO ARE CONTINUING THEIR NEGOTIATIONS AT THE IRAQI
EMBASSY TODAY, HAVE BEEN INFORMED.

2. YOUR PROPOSALS FOR A VISIT INCLUDING DEMONSTRATIONS OF WEAPONS
ARE BEING LOOKED AT AGAIN BY MINTECH. CONSIDERABLE EXPENSE AND
COMPLEXITY OF MOUNTING A FULL SCALE AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM DEMONSTRATION
WOULD HARDLY BE JUSTIFIED, BUT POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES WILL BE
CONSIDERED AT AN INTERDEPARTMENTAL MEETING ON 7 MARCH.

3. WE ALSO ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO THE ARGUMENTS SET OUT IN YOUR TELE-
GRAMS UNDER REVERENCE, BUT AS REGARDS GENERAL POLICY ON ARMS
SALES WE MUST CONTINUE TO OPERATE WITHIN THE CONSIDERATIONS

/EXPLAINED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

EXPLAINED IN PARAGRAPH 7 OF TRIPP'S LETTER OF 26 FEBRUARY TO YOU AND IN MAKINSON'S LETTER NEQ 10/1 OF 10 OCTOBER 1968 TO SAUNDERS. WE WILL HOWEVER DO OUR BEST TO ENSURE THAT SPECIFIC REQUESTS ARE CONSIDERED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. THE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO SELL TIGERCAT SHOULD HELP YOU TO HOLD THE POSITION FOR THE TIME BEING .

4. FUTURE TELEGRAMS ON THE MECHANICS OF A VISIT AND DEMONSTRATION IN CONNECTION WITH AIR DEFENCE SALES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO MINTECH AS/EIR 2 IN THE STOW SERIES WITH COPIES TO F.C.O. AND AS/EIR 1.

STEWART.

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.EAST. DEPT.

N.AFR. DEPT.

ARAB DEPT.

U.N.D.

MILITARY ADVISER

D.T.S.D.

P.U.S.D.

DEF. POL. DEPT.

DIS MOD

CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential

Reference.....

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.15 10 MAR 1969 NEQ 10/3
--

(29)

Mr. Crosthwait

Middle East: Tigercat

Mr. Arthur's minutes of 22 and 25 February linking Tigercat to Iraq (cleared by the Ministry of Defence but awaiting FCO clearance) with a clearance (previously opposed by the Ministry of Defence) for the sale of Tigercat to the U.A.R.).

2. I have written twice to DS 15 (please see 21 and 24); and have telephoned daily; and have specifically mentioned our hope for a substantive answer before Mr. Arthur's visit to Washington this week.

3. Mr. Tallboys has now replied (please see 24) and although the position is not finally decided the indications are that the Ministry of Defence will maintain their objection to the sale of Tigercat to the U.A.R.

4. We can, of course, press the Release of Military Information Policy Committee to give the U.A.R. the same status as Iraq (release up to the level of Restricted), but whether this will be accepted by the Ministry of Defence is another matter. From such knowledge as I have of the workings of the security machinery, I would in any case doubt if a substantive answer could be obtained this week.

J. A. Davidson

(J. A. Davidson)
3 March, 1969

DEFENCE TRAINING & SUPPLY DEPT.

Mr. Crosthwait

To see the above + the MoD letter attached.
I note from Gino telegram 261120Z that the D.A.
has already told the U.A.R. authorities that
Tigercat is not available for sale to them. If,
as I believe is the case, the sale of Tigercat to Iraq
is an active issue, it might be as well to

get it done in principle ~~and then~~
 & system and not wait until the M.D.
 have completed their consideration of the
 security implications of supply to the USSR.

R. C. Thompson

3.3.69

The M.O.D. "interim statement of the position"
 is unsatisfactory. We still do not know
 why "no classified information may be
 supplied to the USSR" while it may be to
 Iraq.

2. You will no doubt wish to probe the reasons
 for this - shall I undertake this?

J.P. Impey

3.3.69.

Mr A. Thompson

Yes. Please pursue. The MOD answer is
 ridiculous. I have spoken to Mr. Leach (DUS(Eq.))
 & we might want
 to hear what he says.

4
3

The Leitch tells me the necessary study is in hand.
 I may hear about a week.

J.P. Impey
7.3.

Mr. Leitch
28.3

Mr. Tripp has now asked Mr
 Speares (M.A.D.) to pursue this.

13
3

MEQ 10//3

10 March, 1969

25
Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter
HU/151/04 of 3 March, 1969, to Mr. Nutting about the
sale of Vigilant to Iraq.

2. I regret that the final paragraph of your letter
gives a misleading impression. As Mr. Hinchcliffe
explained to you on the telephone, we have not yet decided
whether political considerations in this transaction would
permit a sale to be made, because the General Staff vote
on operational grounds appeared to us to be final. We
would wish to reserve the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
position until definite prospects of a sale exist, when we
will, of course, give the proposal sympathetic consideration.
Our decision, however, must depend on the situation at that
time and in the case of Iraq it would be unwise to speculate
at this stage what that decision might be.

3. I am copying this letter to the Arms Working Party
Members.

(D.J.S. Murray)
Defence Training and Supply Department.

Mrs. O. J. Thompson,
RIR 2(b)1,
Ministry of Technology,
Stuart House,
Soho Sq.
London, W.1.

5/P 11/3

Registry
No. *NEP 15/3*

DRAFT

letter

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

26/11

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

To:—

*Mrs. O. J. Thompson,
EIR 2(b)1
United*

From

D. J. S. Munn
Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

*Mr. Hinchcliffe
H. E. J.
Spint.*

A. W. P. Munn.

*As Mr Hinchcliffe
explained to you on
the telephone ~~last~~ ~~week~~
last*

*Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter
HU/151/04 of 3 March 1969 & Mr. Munnings
about the sale of Vigilant to Iraq.*

*I regret that the final paragraph of your
letter gives a misleading impression. We have not
yet decided whether the political considerations in this
transaction would permit a sale to be made,
because the General Staff veto on operational grounds
appears to us to be final. We would wish to reserve
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office position
until definite prospects of a sale exist, when we will
of course, give the proposal sympathetic consideration.
Our decision, however, must depend on the situation at
that time and in the case of Iraq it would be
unwise to speculate/what a decision might be,
^{at this stage}*

I am replying this letter to A. W. P. Munn.

D. J. S. Munn 7/3

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

~~PM~~ 13
Mr Delangel - - 0/3

80 on Jan 29.

I spoke to Mr. Speares
on this today. He

said he wd pursue,
as this is a UAR
(and hence NAD)
concern.

9.8.5
13.3

Reg. he can now p.a.

PMH

14/3



CONFIDENTIAL

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

St. Christopher House, Southwark Street,

LONDON S.E.1

Telephone: 01-928 7999, Ext 3629

copy to
NEQ 6/1

Our ref: A/10/Clearances/1599



12th March 1969

Dear Miss Stevens,

1A/327/69 AND 1A/753/69

In Mr Wade's letter D/DS 13/178 dated 27th February 1969, he asked whether there were other systems comparable with the COBRA if the licence was refused.

I am now writing to inform you that there are several such systems.

1. SS11 and ENTAC, French
2. BANTAN, Swedish
3. MOSQUITO, Swiss
4. SHOPPER, Russian (this with U.A.R. Forces).

These 4 together with the COBRA are all considered to be inferior to the Vigilant, because of their much more difficult operating problems and the type of warhead used.

Whilst, therefore, we have no objection to these being in use with the Iraqis we still object to the sale of Vigilant to Iraq on the grounds already stated. Min Tech letter HU/151/04 dated 3/3/69 refers to this point.

(SGD) A. MILLER

Miss J. E. Stevens
Board of Trade (ELB)
Export Licensing Branch
Hillgate House
35 Old Bailey
E.C.4

Copies to information to:

J.B. Wade Esq
C.A. Alldis Esq
D.J.S. Murray Esq
L.A. Saviger Esq
J. Coates Esq
D.E. Church Esq
~~Miss J.E. Stevens~~
J.A. Patterson Esq
J. Doyle Esq

Ministry of Defence, DS13(b)
Ministry of Defence, Sales 1(W)
Foreign Office, DT & SD
Ministry of Technology, KIR1
Ministry of Technology, KIR 2
Board of Trade, (XP)
~~Board of Trade, (ELB)~~
H.M. Treasury
Department of Economic Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference.....


W. (31)

Mr. Hinchliffe - Near Eastern Department

Please see a copy of Army Sales letter A/10/Clearances/1599 of 12 March 1969 about the Cobra anti-tank missile.

2. The types listed are considered to be inferior to Vigilant. General Staff, therefore, are prepared to accept the fact that the Iraqis ~~oppose~~ the Cobra missile but consider that the improved performance of Vigilant makes it ~~inappropriate~~ for the Iraqis to ~~oppose~~. I presume that this will remove General Staff objections to the supply of the Cobra training aid which we recently approved.

submitable



(D. J. S. Murray)
Defence Training and Supply Dept.
13 March, 1969.

New Murray

I am sure that your presumption is correct. For
Comms rule we will have to await formal approval
R to General Staff.



Neo

18/3/69

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

EIR 2B1, Room 206

Stuart House, 23-25 Soho Square, LONDON W1
 Telex: 22241 Telegrams: Mitech London Telex
 Telephone: 01-437 9288, ext. 301

Our reference: HU/151/04

Our reference: A/10/Clearances/1599

13th March 1969.

Dear Mr. Nutting,

Vigilant - Iraq

Following Mrs. Thompson's letter of 3rd March you confirmed verbally that the General Staff still object on operational grounds to the supply of Vigilant to Iraq.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office advise that we are currently trying to improve our relations with Iraq. If we are not prepared to supply the Iraqis, they will merely find another supplier. There are prospects of an order worth £2M, and for a sale of this importance we would like the matter to be reconsidered in the AWP forum.

The question of our existing treaty obligations towards Kuwait and their duration was touched upon during a meeting on 7th March, attended by Mr. Hinchcliffe of F.C.O., to discuss arrangements for the visit of an Iraqi delegation to the UK. It would, however, be helpful if we could have a formal statement from F.C.O. of our obligations towards Kuwait.

I am copying this letter to all members of the AWP.

I understand that the final paragraph of Mrs. Thompson's letter of 3rd March did not correctly reflect F.C.O.'s view.



Yours sincerely,

F.E. Yates
 (F.E. Yates).

Mr. K.W. Nutting,
 Sales 5b,
 MOD (Army),
 St. Christopher House,
 London, S.E.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

Brig. C. J. C. Sherman,
GSOR1(c) (Army)

Mr. C. G. Warman
D.S.13b

Mrs. J. M. Shephard
D.S.13b

M.O.D., Main Building, Whitehall

Miss L. B. Cramer
Navy Sales Division,
Old Admiralty, Whitehall

Mr. D. J. S. Murray
Defence Supply and Training Section,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
Downing Street

Mr. D. Church
Board of Trade,
Victoria Street, S.W.1.

Miss J. E. Stevens
Board of Trade,
Hillgate House,
35 Old Bailey, E.C.4.

Mr. J. Doyle,
Department of Economic Affairs,
Storey's Gate, S.W.1.

Mr. J. A. Patterson
Treasury,
Whitehall, S.W.1.

Mr. R. W. Browne
Sales 5(a),
Army Dept.,
St. Christopher House, S.E.1.

E.I.R.2(o) - Mr. J. Coates

E.I.R.1(o) - Mr. L. Savigar

Mr. Hindle, N.E.D.Mr. Ibbott, Arabic Dept.Supply of Vigilant & Drag.

Please see Min Tech letter HU/151/04 of 13 March 1969, which notifies their intention to raise the question of the supply of Vigilant & Drag in the Arms Working Party, presumably in the hope that the General Staff will change their mind.

2. (31) says that the alternative systems are all inferior to Vigilant and that consequently the G.S. do not object to the Iraqis having them. It is difficult to see how the Iraqis can find another supplier, if no weapon of this type as good as Vigilant exists. The second sentence of the second paragraph of the Min Tech letter therefore seems odd.

3. I would advise against giving Min Tech a 'formal statement of our obligations towards Kuwait'. This will only be quoted against us when we differ with them, as so frequently happens in arms sales to the Middle East. Far better to retain as much room for tactical manoeuvre as possible.

18 Mar 69

J. P. S. J.
J. P. S. J.

Min Tech are on to their favourite game of trying to enlist our help against M.O.D. Our written answer on Vigilant has been that the question of whether

or not we object to its supply to Iraq — on
political grounds does not arise as long as
Mao is receiving objections to its supply — we do
not intend to enter into under-~~standing~~ whitehall
departmental infighting on this issue especially in
view of the fact that the Iraqis have yet to make
a firm offer for the weapon.

Mo.O. objection to ~~the~~ ^{in service} ~~vicarious~~ ^{learning} with
 They is that it would give them an improved ant. task
 capability which is considered machine-like as to Kunitz's argument
 elements we get (in Mo.O. view) strong enough to have such
 a capability. If Mo.O. feels that there ^{is} still ^{an} ^{element} ^{of} ^{learning}, then
 in my view should close the matter.

As Mr Yates is ^{mainly} concerned with the defense aspects of our obligations towards Kuwait ^{perhaps} it could be suggested that ^{perhaps} a M.O.D. to visit him a man down on there. I agree with Mr Murray on this point.

Pratt H. Webb

20/3/69.

~~Mr. Murray~~
~~DTSD.~~


✓ I do not entirely see what M/Luh
are driving at. Do they expect we
no longer have any commitment to Kinnaird?
✓ If so, they are wrong, and M/D are right
to oppose the sale of Rylands to Irag.
✓ I must leave matters to you, but
✓ I will provide a formal statement
if you decide on it necessary.

உயர்வு.
உ. ப. பி.

W. Hinchliffe, M.B.A.D.

I suggest that we p.a. this and b.v. of W. Yates
re-open the question, M W

22 Ma 69


 J. M. Mann
 D. B. 1900

[Signature]
 25/11/11
~~Mr. Jones~~
 T. Jones
 Pa.
 Pamela
 20/11

NAU10/4

copy to NEQ 60/3

CYPHER CAT A

SECRET

ROUTINE CAIRO

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TEL NO 296.

19 MARCH 1969.

SECRET

VADDSO TO ECO TEL NO 296 OF 19 MARCH RFI TO ALGIERS,
BAHRAIN, BEIRUT, AMMAN, JEDDA, KHARTOUM, KUWAIT, RABAT,
UK MIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

ARMS FOR U.A.R.

YOUR TEL NO 227 TO BAGHDAD.

THE DECISION TO SELL TIGERCATS TO IRAQ OBLIGES ME TO ASK FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE REFUSAL TO SELL THEM TO THE U.A.R.

2. IT DOES NOT SEEM REALISTIC TO SUPPOSE THAT AFTER
DELIVERY TO IRAQ AND, AS THINGS STAND, ITS POSSIBLE INTRODUCTION
BY IRAQI FORCES INTO SYRIA THE WEAPON WILL HAVE ANY SECURITY
FROM THE RUSSIANS OR ANYONE ELSE SERIOUSLY INTERESTED.

3. ALMOST ALL THE ARGUMENTS IN BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO 254
APPLY HERE AND, I BELIEVE, WITH EVEN MORE FORCE.

THE U.A.R. WILL SOON LEARN OF THIS DECISION. THE FACT
THAT WE ARE SUPPLYING TO A COUNTRY WHICH HAS SPECIFICALLY REJECTED
THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AND REFUSING TO A COUNTRY
WHICH HAS ACCEPTED IT WILL BE USED TO QUESTION THE BASIS
OF U.K. / U.A.R. RELATIONS.

/4. I CANNOT

SECRET

4. I CANNOT ARGUE THAT SALE WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE OTHER COMMERCIAL PROSPECTS HERE OR THAT REFUSAL PUTS AT RISK ANY MAJOR BRITISH INTEREST IN THE U.A.R. ITSELF. THE DANGER WHICH I FORSEE AND AM BOUND TO REPRESENT TO YOU IS THAT BY THE SUMMER OR EARLY AUTUMN WE MAY FIND THE U.A.R. ANTAGONISED BY OUR ARMS POLICY (AND QUITE IMPERVIOUS TO ANY ARGUMENT ABOUT IT,) TO THE POINT OF LEADING A DETERMINED CAMPAIGN OF PRESSURE ON THE ARAB STATES TO IMPOSE EMBARGO ON OIL FOR BRITAIN, AND PERHAPS ON THE GULF STATES TO DO US SERIOUS DAMAGE VIA THE STERLING BALANCES.

IT IS NOT FOR ME TO PREDICT WHETHER THEY WOULD SUCCEED BUT UNFORTUNATELY IN BOTH RECENT AND PAST HISTORY THE ABILITY OF EGYPT TO DAMAGE BRITISH INTERESTS HAS PROVED TO BE OUT OF ALL PROPORTION TO HER APPARENT STRENGTH AND INFLUENCE.

FCO PASS TO ALGIERS, BAHRAIN, BEIRUT, AMMAN, JEDDA, KHARTOUM, KUWAIT, RABAT, UK MIS NEW YORK, AND WASHINGTON.

SIR R.BEAUMONT

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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N.AFR. DEPT.

ARAB. DEPT.

U.N.D.

MILITARY ADVISER

D.T.S.D.

P.U.S.D.

DEF. POL. DEPT.

DIS MOD

TELEGRAM SECTION
Room 124 K.C.S
Communications Department

YTC/1

Neq 10/3 -33

NE Dept

Copy/ies of the following telegram has/have been sent

No 296 fm CAIRO
TO:

19.3.69

Head of EIR 1 }
EIR 2 } M/Tech STUART
HOUSE

Head of Defence Sales MOD MAIN

(Signed)

(Department)

(Date)

Action taken in Communications Department:

(Initials)  (Date) 20-3-69

AFTER ACTION THIS FORM SHOULD BE SENT TO
THE APPROPRIATE REGISTRY FOR RETENTION

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference.....

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES N° 15

21 March 1969

NAU-10/4

Mr. Speares (North African Department)

Tigercat for Iraq and U.A.R.

A decision on Tigercat for Iraq became urgent because Shorts had been called in to the Iraqi Embassy to continue their negotiations. They could not take matters any further until they knew the views of HMG.

2. Mr. Arthur recommended that the FCO should say that there was no objection to the supply of Tigercat to Iraq but should make it a condition that this would also apply to U.A.R. The Minister of State agreed with the decision as regards Iraq but added that the U.A.R. point should not be made an absolute condition since time was so short and we could not expect reconsideration in the Ministry of Defence quickly enough to give advice to Shorts. Mr. Roberts said however that we should urge reconsideration as regards the U.A.R.

3. The case of the U.A.R. is, I understand, being looked at again and the Iraqi decision could well be useful. As you know, there are many similarities and the Iraqi army has a large number of Russian technicians attached to it. It is probably because of the Russian advisers to the U.A.R. that the Ministry of Defence maintain their security objection. This can now hardly hold water in view of the decision for Iraq.

A. A. Acland

(A. A. Acland)
10 March, 1969

*N. Roberts
Mr. Speares*

*We had better weigh in on
Tigercat. Judging from the 1700's
brief for the Bangi visit there is
still a very unreconstructed attitude
there about the UAR - even as
combined with Iraq! Please
consider the best way of pursuing
the question urgently with N.O.*

CONFIDENTIAL

*Now see Mr. Speares letter to Mr. Tallboys
P.A.*

*11/3
20/3*

34a.

Copy.

Top Copy ~~NEQ10/2~~ (35)

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG
PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 227

TO BAGHDAD
5 MARCH 1969. (NE)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 227 OF 5 MARCH REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION SAVING TO CAIRO ALGIERS BAHRAIN BEIRUT AMMAN
JEDDA KHARTOUM KUWAIT RABAT TEL AVIV TRIPOLI TUNIS UKMIS NEW YORK
WASHINGTON

YOUR TELEGRAM NOS. 249, 250 AND 254 (NOT TO ALL):

ARMS FOR IRAQ.

APPROVAL HAS NOW BEEN GIVEN FOR THE SALE OF TIGERCAT TO IRAQ.
SHORTS, WHO ARE CONTINUING THEIR NEGOTIATIONS AT THE IRAQI
EMBASSY TODAY, HAVE BEEN INFORMED.

2. YOUR PROPOSALS FOR A VISIT INCLUDING DEMONSTRATIONS OF WEAPONS
ARE BEING LOOKED AT AGAIN BY MINTECH. CONSIDERABLE EXPENSE AND
COMPLEXITY OF MOUNTING A FULL SCALE AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM DEMONSTRATION
WOULD HARDLY BE JUSTIFIED, BUT POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES WILL BE
CONSIDERED AT AN INTERDEPARTMENTAL MEETING ON 7 MARCH.

3. WE ALSO ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO THE ARGUMENTS SET OUT IN YOUR TELE-
GRAMS UNDER REVERENCE, BUT AS REGARDS GENERAL POLICY ON ARMS
SALES WE MUST CONTINUE TO OPERATE WITHIN THE CONSIDERATIONS

/EXPLAINED

CONFIDENTIAL

(No Adlam) N.C. Dept. 1/3
Indicate this working
dealt with by
NO-ACLAND 8
Can you tell us what
resulted from the Attorney's
insistence that Principles for the
U.A.R. should be reconsidered
at the same time?
X J. [unclear] 6/3

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

EXPLAINED IN PARAGRAPH 7 OF TRIPP'S LETTER OF 26 FEBRUARY TO YOU AND IN MAKINSON'S LETTER NEQ 10/1 OF 10 OCTOBER 1968 TO SAUNDERS. WE WILL HOWEVER DO OUR BEST TO ENSURE THAT SPECIFIC REQUESTS ARE CONSIDERED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. THE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO SELL TIGERCAT SHOULD HELP YOU TO HOLD THE POSITION FOR THE TIME BEING .

4. FUTURE TELEGRAMS ON THE MECHANICS OF A VISIT AND DEMONSTRATION IN CONNECTION WITH AIR DEFENCE SALES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO MINTECH AS/EIR 2 IN THE STOW SERIES WITH COPIES TO F.C.O. AND AS/EIR 1.

STEWART.

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

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N.AFR. DEPT.

ARAB DEPT.

U.N.D.

MILITARY ADVISER

D.T.S.D.

P.U.S.D.

DEF. POL. DEPT.

DIS MOD

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

NEO
Enter please (35)
21/11/69



R/Sales(N) 2/26/8/1

19 March 1969

Dear Mrs Smith,

With reference to your letter HU/151/011-07 dated 24th February, 1969, there is no Navy Department objection to the supply of Tigercat and Blowpipe to Iraq provided level of release is no higher than Restricted.

I am copying this letter to Mr Murray (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Mr Verman (DS 13B MOD(N)).

Yours sincerely,

J.E. JEEVES

Mrs V. Smith
Ministry of Technology
KIR 2B2
Stuart House
23-25 Abchurch Lane
LONDON E.C.4

Mr D. J. S. Murray
Defence Training and Supply Dept
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
LONDON S.W.1

Mr C. G. Verman
DS13B
Room 0217
Ministry of Defence, Main Building
CAN/27

RESTRICTED

P. A. [Signature]
26/3
P. A. [Signature]
27/3

NEQ 10/3

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A.

ROUTINE BAGHDAD

TELEGRAM NUMBER STOW 9

TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY.

21 MARCH 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO MINTECH TELNO. STOW 9 OF 21 MARCH.

FOR EIR 2B2. TIGERCAT. YOUR STOW 9 DATED 19TH MARCH 1969 REFERS.

1. I UNDERSTAND IRAQI M.A. IN LONDON HAS REPORTED BACK SINCE MEETING WITH SHORTS ON 7TH MARCH BUT DO NOT KNOW HOW MUCH DETAIL OR WHAT RECOMMENDATION HE HAS INCLUDED.
2. IF PROPOSED PROGRAMME FOR IRAQI DELEGATION TO U.K. IS AGREED, THEY WILL BE VISITING SHORTS IN BELFAST ON TUESDAY APRIL 22ND. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT ANY DECISION WILL BE TAKEN BEFORE THAT DATE.
3. IRAQI INTEREST IS VERY SERIOUS AND I SUGGEST THAT HILL COULD USEFULLY VISIT BAGHDAD BETWEEN NOW AND THE VISIT OF THE DELEGATION. IF HILL COMES THERE WILL BE NO DIFFICULTY ABOUT PUTTING HIM IN TOUCH WITH THE RESPONSIBLE BRANCH AND I THINK THAT ASKING FOR AN INVITATION MAY LEAD TO LOSS OF TIME.
4. I RECOMMEND THAT HE COMES AS PROPOSED AT THE END OF MARCH TO PREPARE THE GROUND FOR THE SIGNATURE OF A CONTRACT EITHER DURING OR IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE DELEGATION'S VISIT TO U.K. DURING THE PROPOSED PERIOD 18TH APRIL - 1ST MAY.

MR. EVANS

/SENT TO D.C.C. FOR MINTECH/

STOW DISTRIBUTION

N. EASTERN D.

DEF. TR. & S.D.

pa PNNM

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 9 25 APR 1969
NEQ 10/3

Enter please.

R.I.R.201

24/IV

Q.

301

NE/151/04

A/10/Clearance/1999

17th April, 1969

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL

Dear

32

Vigilant - Iraq

We spoke on 16th April. I should be grateful for a reply to my letter of 13th March as soon as possible.

Meanwhile we have been somewhat embarrassed by a request from the Iraqi Military Attache in the U.K. for prices of Vigilant and Swingfire. We are being as non-committal as possible to avoid upsetting the Iraqis whose delegation is due to visit the U.K. shortly.

If there is to be any relaxation of the earlier objections to the supply of Vigilant. I would also appreciate advice on the possible supply of Swingfire.

I am copying this letter to Mr. Murray of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Yours

(F.H. Yates)

Mr. K.W. Hatting,
Sales Sq.
Army Dept.,
St. Christopher House.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL

PA
PMM
30/4

CONFIDENTIAL

(38)

From: A. Miller - Sales 5(b)(A)




Euler
R
28/4

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
St. Christopher House, Southwark Street,
LONDON S.E.1

TELEPHONE:- 01-928 7999 Extn: 3629

Our Ref: 1Q/Clearance/1599

Your Ref: HU/151/04



April 1969

Dear

(37)
VIGILANT - IRAQ

Your letter dated 17 April 1969 refers.

We have again consulted the General Staff on this matter and they are unwilling to relax their operational objections to the sale of Vigilant to Iraq. They are the same as stated in our letter dated 12 November 1968.


We have also consulted them on Swingfire and their views are exactly the same on this as they are on Vigilant. In addition there are also strong objections on equipment Security grounds. The system has only just come into Service and on current rules cannot be released to fringe areas until 1971 at the earliest. In the case of Iraq this would probably be extended to 1973. It also has Confidential aspects and so would require clearance by R.M.I.P.C.

F.E. Yates, Esq.,
Ministry of Technology, KIR 261,
Stuart House,
23-25 Soho Square,
LONDON, W.1.

Re 10/4
30/4

(A)
Copy to:- D.J.S. Murray Esq., - FVCO
J.B. Wade, Esq., - DS.13
1Q/Clearance/2023

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher / CAT A

PRIORITY BAGHDAD

TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

TELEGRAM NO. STOW 21

19 MAY 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Ministry of Technology Telegram No. STOW 21 of 19 May repeated for information to Defence Attache Beirut.

From Defence Attache Baghdad for EIR 2B2.

Tigercat.

Hill of Shorts in a letter dated 1 May told me that if Iraqis did not decide on Tigercat by 14 May stocks might be diverted to other states.

This was because he had heard in United Kingdom that Iraqis did not repeat did not want Tigercat.

2. We have been expecting Hill here on various dates since 9 May and he may yet appear.

3. In the meantime I have tried to get answer from Iraqis but Staff Officer concerned has referred me to D C G S who has not been available recently.

4. I may however see him before Hill arrives and therefore request guidance on the following:-

A. Does Shorts offer on prices and delivery still hold good despite Iraqis failure to answer by 14 May as stipulated in offer made on 14 January, 1969?

B. If not are the Iraqis to regard the deal as off or are they to expect a new and less favourable offer?

5. Should Hill appear with the answers or the Iraqis state that they are not interested I will inform you.

F.C.O. Pass Beirut.

Mr. Evans.

[Sent to Ministry of Technology]

[Repeated as requested]

STOW DISTRIBUTION

Near Eastern Dept.

D.T.S.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

Pa MWM
20/5.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL
UK EYES ONLY

HU/151/01

Reg & Pa. (40)
WMM

Notes of Meeting in Room 115 Stuart House on 4th June 1969
to consider Iraqi requests for G.W. quotations and delivery dates

25/6

Present:

Mintech

Mr. M.M.J. Gammon - AS/EIR2 (Chairman) ✓
Mr. S. Addison - EIR2B2
Mr. F. E. Yates - EIR2B1

F.C.O.

Mr. P.R.M. Hinchcliffe

M.O.D.

Brig. C.J.C. Sherman - ACGS(OR) (Army Dept.)
Gp. Capt. N.W. Wakelin - D. RAF (P & SS)
Wg. Cdr. Perrin - OR 18 (RAF)
Sq. Ldr. J. M. McMinn - Ops (SAM)1a (RAF)
Sq. Ldr. R. Grant - GD2b (RAF)
Mr. E. B. Abbotts - DS 13



1. Current Political Situation in Iraq

(a) General Instability

Iraq is one of the most politically unstable countries in the Middle East. Frequent changes of Government make it extremely difficult to give any long term indication of future Iraqi intentions and attitudes and this is an important factor when considering entering into Long Term Commitments.

(b) Baathist Party Divisions and Effect on Sales Prospects

- (i) The ruling Baathist Party has a strong pro-Soviet left wing led by General Mehdi Ammash, and a "pro-Western" right wing led by the Deputy Prime Minister Hardan Takriti, who placed orders for UK equipment in 1963.
- (ii) The recent Iraqi/Soviet Economic and Technical Co-operation Agreement, recognition of the G.D.R., the Sulphur deal with Poland, and other exchanges and agreements with Bloc countries suggest that Takriti's influence is waning. There appears to be very little we can do to stop this trend. Takriti and his staff are now in Moscow in response to a Russian invitation to evaluate an up dated version of the Mig.21 and to talk about possible supply of other hardware.
- (iii) Takriti may well have gone to Moscow to show that he is a good socialist and as anti imperialist as the other members of the Baath Leadership. He is looking for HMG support in obtaining a settlement with IPC, preferably one for which he could take some credit, in which case his own position within the Leadership must be strengthened to the extent that he would be in a position to place orders for arms from the UK.
- (iv) The Iraqis are probably receiving substantial aid from the Eastern Bloc and are probably not now so dependant on commerce with the West or aid from non-communist countries.

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(c) IPC Negotiations

- (i) The Iraqi's are currently demanding as a token of goodwill from the IPC consortium payment of £50M described as back payments and royalty expensing. IPC want tangible benefits in return, but do not expect to be offered any. Moreover they are not anxious to pay more in the face of possible nationalisation.
- (ii) Although committed in principle to nationalisation the Baathists seem unlikely to nationalise IPC for a few years because their own company. The I.N.O.C. would be unable to exploit IPC's concessions successfully. Nationalisation could come in 2 or in 20 years time. However it is difficult to give an accurate assessment on this as the Iraqis are so unpredictable and always capable of acting hastily without real regard to their own best interests.
- (iii) F.C.O. are not in a position to put pressure for a settlement on the IPC consortium, which includes the U.S. and France, nor indeed would wish to intervene unless (possibly) if asked to do so by the company.
- (iv) IPC probably would not welcome intervention. They are content to carry on as at present hoping for a change of government and a more favourable settlement. The present regime is so unstable that even if IPC agreed to pay the £50M there is no guarantee that the Iraqis would not ask for even more.
- (v) Although the general trend (no doubt aided by the Iranian settlement) is for countries to demand increased royalties, it might suit IPC to increase output in one country and cut-back elsewhere.

(d) UK Interests in Neighbouring Countries

(i) Kuwait

Iraq lays claim to Kuwait. (At present this claim is dormant, it could be reactivated). We obtain more oil from Kuwait than from Iraq and our interests in the Sheikdom are greater than in Iraq. This situation is likely to continue for some time. Moreover Kuwait enjoys greater political stability than Iraq. The balance of advantage to the UK lies in supporting Kuwait.

(ii) Iran

Iran is likely to act more rationally and responsibly in their claim to Bahrain than would the Iraqis in their claim to Kuwait. UK interests in Iran (which is a fellow member of CENTO) are as great if not greater than in any other country in the Middle East. We must avoid offending Iran which has a dispute with Iraq over Shatt-al-Arab. BAC's Aircraft Division are anxious to sell Lightnings, but the GW Division are reluctant to sell GW and jeopardise potential sales to Iran.

(iii) Other Countries

Before finally deciding to supply GW to Iraq it may be necessary to consult other Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia.

/((c))

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(e) Iraqi Hostility to the West

- (i) Since the UK criticised, by implication, the recent executions the Iraq press have become increasingly hostile in tone toward the UK.
- (ii) They have also been hostile to the US and W. Germany whom they regard as friends of Israel.
- (iii) More recently they have included the UK in this charge which they have also linked with charges arising from our CENTO membership and alleged spying for the US.
- (iv) FCO also report a less helpful attitude towards British businessmen generally in recent weeks.

2. Security Position

(a) Obligations to Kuwait

We are pledged to give air support. Despite our proposed withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971 contingency planning beyond that date assumes continued British support to protect our extensive interests. [If returned to power the Conservatives may reverse the withdrawal policy.] Supply of SAGW to Iraq would contribute to instability in the area.

(b) Security Rating of Iraq

The present low rating stems from the inherent political instability of the country and its increasing links with the Eastern Bloc.

(c) Security Protection of British GW

(i) Thunderbird

Present classification of Confidential precludes supply to Iraq. Weapon will remain in UK Service until well after 1975 and possibly even up to 1980.

(ii) Rapier

The Russians have no comparable low level weapon; hence the need for special protection. Problems of training and special publications need to be borne in mind. If the Iranians buy Rapier we should be even more hard pressed to supply Iraq.

(iii) Blowpipe

The rule of overseas deliveries at least 18 months after initial deliveries to the UK Services would apply. The mid-1973 date is considered unrealistic.

(iv) Suggested Alternative

We have offered to supply Tigercoat, so far without response, possibly due to the swing towards the Eastern Bloc. The Iraqis could be reminded if a suitable opportunity occurs of this gesture of goodwill.

/3 Conclusions

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3. Conclusions

- (i) The Iraqis should be informed that neither Thunderbird nor Rapier could be supplied before 1975 at the earliest, and no guarantee could be given at this time that the weapons would be available for supply even then. Deliveries could be substantially later. No classified information should be supplied.
- (ii) The earliest date for supply of Blowpipe was mentioned as mid-1973, this could vary depending upon the duration of the development programme. In any case the Army Dept. would wish the 18 months rule to apply.
- (iii) Equally with Thunderbird and Rapier supply would be dependent, in part, upon the political, stability and security conditions prevailing in Iraq at the time.
- (iv) If the Iraqis display further interest EIR will refer back for further consideration by all concerned.

EIR2B

Stuart House

Tel: 01-437-9288

Ext. 301

24 June, 1969

(F. E. YATES)

Copy to: All those present
US/EIR

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EXTRACT FROM THE MINUTES OF
THE RAPIER SALES ADVISORY GROUP
MEETING, HELD ON THE 11 JUNE 1969.



Iraq

10. Mr. Vernall informed the Advisory Group ^{at} with the recent approaches by the Iraqis for information on British g.w. He said it was not in the interests of

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/either

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either H.M.G. or B.A.C. to promote Rapier in Iraq at this juncture for a variety of reasons and at the special meeting chaired by AS/EIR 2 on 4th June the line taken had been that the Iraqis should be informed that they could not expect their delivery of Rapier before 1975 at the earliest, and no guarantee could be given at this time that the weapons would be available for supply even then. No classified information could be supplied.

Pa PLM/H

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Mr. Stephens 29/10
PROD
then reg. etc.
DA/40E



Mr. Hunka

British Embassy,
Beirut,
c/o F.C.O.,
King Charles Street,
London, S.W.1.

from 29/10

Ministry of Technology, US/EIR,
Stuart House,
23-25 Abbe Square,
London, W.1.

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REGISTRY No. 10
30 OCT 1969
NEQ 10/3

20 October 1969.

(42)

SALE OF TIGERCAT - SYRIA

A Syrian businessman has visited my office and made a direct enquiry about the possibility of the sale of the Tigercat anti-aircraft missile to the Syrian Army. The man is resident in Lebanon and is believed to have good connections with the Syrian Ministry of Defence.

It seems apparent from other enquiries and reports received in Beirut that the Syrians are trying to find an alternative source of supply of military equipment to offset their complete dependence on the Russians, and it follows, despite that fact we do not have diplomatic relations, that there may be expanding opportunities for sale of general military stores at least, such as trucks, wireless, clothing etc.

I am reporting this approach for interest, but have been advised by Chancery to reply on the lines of Mr. Bell's letter NES 10/2 of 18 July 1969 (not to all) namely by saying that even if a firm order were placed we should probably be unable to authorise the sale in view of the present absence of diplomatic relations between ourselves and Syria.

J.M. Evans

(J.M. EVANS),
Colonel,
Defence Attache.

Copies to:- Ministry of Defence, DI4. ✓

F.C.O. (Near Eastern Department).

Military Deputy, Head of Defence Sales,
Ministry of Defence.

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REGISTRY NO 10
29 DEC 1969
NEO 10/3

Ha. N.E. *Sept*
Ha. D.T.S. *Sept*

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NO DISTRIBUTION

OUT TO BAGHDAD
UNIT 15

TELNO STOW 44 OF 19/12 CYPHER/CAT A MC GROARTY

LAST PAPER

ROUTINE

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FOR DEFENCE ATTACHE FROM EIR2B.

N/A.
YOUR STOW 44 TO F.C.O. I UNDERSTAND THAT IRAQIS DID REQUEST
A QUOTATION FOR RAPIER SOME MONTHS AGO, PROBABLY DURING VISIT OF
IRAQI DELEGATION LAST APRIL. NO ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN ON THIS BY
B.A.C. AND NONE IS INTENDED. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION THE SITUATION
IS SUCH THAT FOR POLITICAL AND SECURITY REASONS THERE CAN BE NO
QUESTION OF SUPPLYING IRAQIS WITH RAPIER UNTIL THE MIDDLE OR LATE
1975'S, IF THEN, AND NO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION CAN BE GIVEN TO
THEM ABOUT THE SYSTEM. FRITH HAS WRITTEN INDICATING OUR DESIRE TO
DIVERT IRAQI ATTENTIONS AWAY FROM RAPIER/BLOWPIPE AND TOWARDS
TIGERCAT, AND THUS OUR CURRENT EFFORTS ARE CONCENTRATED BEHIND
SHORTS.

Re MM

111.

LAST PAPER

Reyes I own that the

*copy sent
to DTSD*

DTSD copy in

to file? Y not, enter

done this & let me have a

PM 29/12

Sale Of Anti-Aircraft Missiles To Iraq And Syria. Sale Of Missiles To Iraq. 20 Oct. 1969. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 17/891. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107456236/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=8d48dbf9&pg=1. Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.